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 Abstract 
 Th is article considers whether room exists within the current system of nationalities regional auton-
omy (NRA) in China to accommodate Tibetan aspirations for “genuine autonomy” under the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) sovereignty. It examines the legal framework for NRA in China, 
as well as Chinese government policy and practice toward autonomous areas, in terms of the limita-
tions and possibilities they imply for realizing Tibetan aspirations for autonomy, highlighting spe-
ciﬁ c areas of concern, opportunities and constraints. It explores the development of political and 
legal approaches toward autonomy since the 1930s, the nature of the current framework and how 
recent legal and political developments interact with that framework. It looks at options for auton-
omy under the Chinese Constitution and national legislation, particularly the  self-government of 
nationality (minority) autonomous areas as well as Article 31 of the Constitution which has pro-
vided the basis for the establishment of special administrative regions (SARs). Since autonomous 
areas also exercise the general powers of local governments in the PRC, it describes the general 
system of local government at the provincial and lower administrative levels. Th e article examines 
the practical implementation and operation of minority autonomy and SARs including the appar-
ent gap between law and practice. In particular, special attention is paid to the role of the Chinese 
Communist Party and its oﬃ  cials which have a signiﬁ cant impact on the exercise of state powers. 
It concludes that there are formidable obstacles to the autonomy that Tibetans seek in order to 
preserve their culture, values and identity. 
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 1. Introduction 
 Negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and Beijing have stopped 
and started several times since the 1980s, but little progress has been made. 
Signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences still exist between the Chinese and Tibetan positions and 
 *)  Th e authors would like to thank Jill Cottrell for her help with the editing of the article. 
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prospects for meaningful developments in the short term appear unpromising. 1 
Most recently, talks between Tibetan exiles and Beijing in July and November 
2008 failed to achieve results and the Tibetan exile community, which met in 
India later in November 2008, has decided to stop sending envoys to meet with 
Chinese authorities, although it has reaﬃ  rmed non-violence and a “Middle Way 
Approach”. At the same time, tensions within Tibetan areas in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) remain high. Violent protests erupted in March 2008, 
followed by a crackdown, and the Public Security Bureau in Lhasa reportedly 
detained more than 81 people in a “strike hard” campaign launched in January 
2009, possibly to forestall demonstrations marking the 50th anniversary of the 
suppression of a Tibetan uprising in March 1959. 2 
 Beijing insists that any solution to the “Tibet question” must be found 
within the existing system, based on provisions in the Constitution, the Law on 
National Regional Autonomy (LNRA), and policy documents. 3 Th e Tibetans are 
 demanding “genuine autonomy”, a concept ﬁ rst articulated by the Dalai Lama in 
Strasbourg in 1988 and most recently presented in a “Memorandum on Genuine 
Autonomy” during discussions on 4 and 5 November 2008 in Beijing. 4 
 Th is article considers whether room exists within the current system of national 
regional autonomy (NRA) in China to accommodate Tibetan aspirations for 
“genuine autonomy” under PRC sovereignty. It examines the legal framework for 
NRA in China, as well as Chinese government policy and practice toward auton-
omous areas, in terms of the limitations and possibilities they imply for realizing 
Tibetan aspirations for autonomy, highlighting speciﬁ c areas of concern, oppor-
tunities and constraints. It explores the development of political and legal 
 1)   See Shi Jiangtao, ‘“Middle Way” Unlikely to Bring Softer Stance’,  South China Morning Post , 
24 November 2008, p. 6 and Recommendation of the First Special General Meeting Convened 
Under Article 59 of the Charter, 22 November 2008, available at: <www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id
=595&articletype=ﬂ ash&rmenuid=morenews>. 
 2)  Associated Press, ‘China Detains 81 People in Crackdown: Media’, 27 January 2009. 
 3)  For a discussion of Beijing’s position on – and reasons for rejection of – the Dalai Lama’s pro-
posal,  see He Baogang, ‘Th e Dalai Lama’s Autonomy Proposal’, in B. Sautman and J. T. Dreyer 
(eds.),  Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Region (2006) 67–84. 
 4)  Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, 2008, available at: <www.tibet
.net/en/index.php?id=78&articletype=press>.  See also Th e Department of Information and 
International Relations (DIIR),  Th e Middle-Way Approach: A Framework For Resolving Th e Issue Of 
Tibet , Th e Central Tibetan Administration, available at: <www.tibet.net/en/diir/sino/std/imwa
.html>, updated August 2006, and Address to Members of the European Parliament by His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama, 15 June 1988, Tibet Justice Center, available at: <www.tibetjustice.org/
materials/tibet/tibet4.html>. Th e key features of the “Middle Way Approach” include the establish-
ment of a Tibetan political entity “comprising the three traditional provinces of Tibet”; genuine 
nationalities regional autonomy; an elected legislature and executive and an independent judiciary; 
eventual transformation of Tibet into a zone of peace with limited Chinese forces based in Tibet in 
the meantime; China would have responsibility only for the “political aspects of Tibet’s interna-
tional relations and defense”; and an end to human rights violations and the policy of population 
transfer of Han Chinese into Tibetan areas. 
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 5)  Y.P. Ghai,  Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: Th e Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the 
Basic Law (1999) pp. 137–188 and Y.P. Ghai, ‘Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnic 
and Economic Diversity’, in Y.P. Ghai (ed.),  Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims 
in Multi-Ethnic States (2000) pp. 77–98. 
 6)  P.B. Potter, ‘Governance of the Periphery: Balancing Local Autonomy and National Unity’, 19 
 Colum. J. Asian L. (2005) pp. 294–296. 
approaches toward autonomy since the 1930s, the nature of the current frame-
work and how recent legal and political developments interact with that frame-
work. It looks at options for autonomy under the Chinese Constitution and 
national legislation, particularly the self-government of nationality ( minority) 
autonomous areas as well as Article 31 of the Constitution which has provided 
the basis for the establishment of special administrative regions (SARs). Since 
autonomous areas also exercise the general powers of local governments in the 
PRC, it describes the general system of local government at the provincial and 
lower administrative levels. Th e article examines the practical implementation 
and operation of minority autonomy and SARs including the apparent gap 
between law and practice. In particular, special attention is paid to the role of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its oﬃ  cials which have a signiﬁ cant impact 
on the exercise of state powers. 
 Th e current weak status of the rule of law in China, the lack of a democratic 
political system, as well as state priorities emphasizing unity, sovereignty, CCP 
control, and economic development create considerable obstacles for realizing 
genuine autonomy within the existing system. 5 Th e preoccupation with sover-
eignty and centralisation of power fails to provide an eﬀ ective guarantee of the 
distribution or sharing of power, reducing “autonomy” purely to an administra-
tive device. 
 Th ese limitations are reﬂ ected in the language of the laws and regulations 
themselves as well as in apparent breaches of the legal provisions and the func-
tioning of the system in practice. For example, NRA does not designate matters, 
such as culture, in which the central authorities  cannot interfere. Th e constraints 
are also inextricably linked to the ultimate objectives of the NRA system. 
Autonomy is the centrepiece of China’s ethnic policy, designed both to hold its 
minority communities together and to expand its jurisdiction through the re-
uniﬁ cation of Greater China. Its aims have included securing the cooperation of 
border regions; the eventual political and cultural integration of these regions and 
ensuring stability. Th e process of legalization of autonomy policy has been an 
attempt to lend legitimacy and predictability to government policies rather than 
to make signiﬁ cant changes in relations between minority areas and the central 
government. 6 Some of these constraints on minority autonomy also apply to 
Hong Kong and Macao as special administrative regions established on the basis 
of Article 31 of the Constitution. Indeed, although Article 31 seems to provide 
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    7)  C.P. Mackerras,  China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century 
(1994) pp. 153–166 and 264–265. 
    8)  B. Sautman, ‘Resolving the Tibet Question: Problems and Prospects’, 11  Journal of Contemporary 
China (2002) p. 82. 
    9)  He Baogang, and B. Sautman, ‘Th e Politics of the Dalai Lama’s New Initiative for Autonomy’, 
78  Paciﬁ c Aﬀ airs (2005). 
 10)  T. Rabgey and T. W. Sharlho, ‘Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era’, East-West Center, 
 Policy Studies 12, Washington, 2004, p. 28. 
 11)  D. Fraser, ‘Hollywood can be Inspiration for Tibet, says Dalai Lama, Scottish Example of 
Devolution is Praised’,  Th e Herald , 19 November 2005. 
potential ﬂ exibility for structuring autonomy options – and reﬂ ects the original 
meaning of NRA, as promised in the 1952 General Program for the Implementation 
of Regional Autonomy for Minorities (General Programme) and an agreement 
reached between Beijing and Tibet in 1951 – political realities suggest that its 
application is unlikely in the Tibetan context. 
 Th ere seems to be agreement among scholars that the limitations of the NRA 
framework – and the Chinese government’s insistence on the continuation of this 
system – render Tibetan hopes for genuine autonomy improbable under current 
conditions. Some have argued that the NRA system grants signiﬁ cant autonomy 
in the areas of culture, language and economy, although there are problems with 
its enforcement. 7 Despite the limitations, others believe that negotiating the 
future of Tibet within the existing system may be a more realistic position than a 
rejection of the legal and political framework which could eﬀ ectively end any 
impetus for negotiations. Sautman claims that China has not taken the Dalai 
Lama’s call for genuine autonomy seriously, in part because Beijing believes he 
wants to “completely negate the value of the existing system of ethnic regional 
autonomy in Tibet”. 8 He and Sautman assert that a useful focus for negotiations 
would be “improving” the current system so that the autonomy it envisages may 
be exercised to the fullest possible extent. 9 Some suggest emphasizing the beneﬁ ts 
of resolution and the potential costs of delaying negotiations, 10 while reassuring 
Beijing that Tibetan proposals pose no threat to the sovereignty and integrity of 
the Chinese state. Precedents could be drawn from other countries which have 
attempted to balance national and local concerns through a variety of forms of 
autonomy. 11 
 Th e article concludes, however, that neither NRA nor the Article 31 frame-
work is adequate for the accommodation of the aspirations and speciﬁ c needs of 
Tibetans, and that it would be desirable to negotiate on the basis of the unique 
situation of Tibet, the speciﬁ city of its historical connections with China, and its 
distinctive religious and cultural traditions. Quite apart from minority issues, 
Chinese scholars and policy makers have started to discuss constitutional reforms 
to deal with the political, economic and social changes of the last two decades, in 
which stronger judicial institutions, greater distribution of power, and 
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 12)  W. Smith,  China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy , East-West Center, Washington,  Working Papers 
No. 2, October 2004, p. 2. 
 13)  Th is term is now commonly translated into English in oﬃ  cial Chinese documents as “ethnicity” 
rather than “nationality”. 
 14)  C. Mackerras,  China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation (2003) p. 2. For a comprehensive 
analysis of the Chinese ethnic classiﬁ cation system in Yunnan,  see T. Mullaney,  Coming to Terms 
with the Nation: Ethnic Classiﬁ cation and Scientiﬁ c Statecraft in Modern China, 1928-1954 , PhD 
Dissertation, Columbia University, 2006. 
 democratization feature prominently. While the current system presents oppor-
tunities, it also contains ﬂ aws which inhibit the fulﬁ lment of Tibetan aspirations 
for genuine autonomy and, therefore, real autonomy could only be achieved by 
altering the legal and policy framework. 
 Part 2 of the article reviews China’s autonomy in policy and law from the 
1930s to the 1990s; Part 3 assesses the current legal framework; Part 4 examines 
the operation of the nationalities regional autonomy in practice including the 
workings of political representation, the role of the Communist Party, the exer-
cise of local and autonomous legislative powers, and regulations and policy related 
to religion and language. Part 5 presents conclusions as well as possibilities for the 
way forward. 
 2. China’s Autonomy Policy and Law from the 1930s to the 1990s 
 Th e PRC’s policy toward minority groups has consistently aimed at gradually 
integrating minorities and border regions more thoroughly into a uniﬁ ed multi-
ethnic state. As such, minority and autonomy arrangements have often been con-
ceived of as temporary, although possibly long-term, transitional measures 
addressing political and social realities but moving toward ensuring state interests 
and control. Th is approach reﬂ ects both Marxist-Leninist theory and imperial 
Chinese culture. 12 Even the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative 
Regions – which are not minority regimes – have been established as temporary, 
50-year measures prior to eventual, full integration. Th e history of Chinese policy 
on national minorities has been characterized by pragmatism rather than princi-
ple, and current realities and priorities of state control and integration have taken 
precedence over real autonomy. 
 2.1. Policy 
 Th e CCP’s understanding of nationality ( minzu 13 ) is an adaptation of Stalin’s 
1913 deﬁ nition of nationality: a “historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”. 14 
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 15)  For more detail on the CCP’s changing policy on self-determination,  see Xia Chunli, ‘Reappraising 
the Right of Self-determination of the People’s Republic of China: How Far Can China Go?’, 8:2 
 Asia-Paciﬁ c Journal on Human Rights and the Law (2007). 
 16)  Most notably with the Hui and the Mongols – but the Tibetans were not in this category, with 
the exception of a few individuals. J. T. Dreyer,  China’s Forty Millions: National Minorities and 
National Integration in the PRC (1979) p. 71. As a reﬂ ection of this cooperation, some autonomous 
areas were set up in areas controlled by the CCP in the early 1940s. 
 17)  Mao Zedong,  CCP Policy on Minority Nationalities (1938), translated in ‘Ethnic Com-
partmentalism and Regional Autonomy in the PRC’, XIV  Chinese Law and Government (Winter 
1981–82) p. 7. 
 18)  State Council of the PRC, White Paper on Regional Autonomy (2005), Section I.2. 
 19)  K.P. Kaup,  Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (2000) p. 88. 
 20)  Mullaney has demonstrated how Chinese anthropologists adapted the Stalinist classiﬁ cation 
scheme to ﬁ t a consensus among scholars on the basis of ethnicity in China, using language as the 
primary marker of ethnic distinctions.  See Mullaney,  supra note 14, pp. 214–215. 
 Although the CCP, under the inﬂ uence of the Comintern in 1931, ﬁ rst 
accepted Lenin’s more radical deﬁ nition of self-determination for ethnic groups 
in China and assured a right to independence for minority areas, it retracted this 
promise by 1935 – as well as notions of federalism based on the Soviet model. 
Th e shift away from self-determination and towards autonomy came after the 
Long March (1934–35) cemented Mao Zedong’s status as paramount leader of 
the Chinese communist movement. 15 Under Mao, the nationalist and pragmatic 
orientation of the Party brought in a diﬀ erentiated approach to the various minor-
ity groups located on China’s periphery, one based on cooperation with certain 
groups that had been crucial to ensuring the CCP’s survival in diﬃ  cult years. 16 
Th ose nationalities who joined the United Front formed by the CCP to ﬁ ght 
against the Japanese were to be accorded “the right to handle their own aﬀ airs and 
at the same time to unite with the Hans in building a uniﬁ ed country”. 17 Th us the 
Chinese government’s 2005 White Paper on ethnic issues states, “the patriotic 
spirit formed during the ﬁ ght against foreign invasions in modern times is the 
political basis for practicing regional autonomy for ethnic minorities”. 18 
 After the founding of the PRC, the Chinese version of NRA was gradually 
articulated and developed, ﬁ rst in the 1949 Common Programme of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC), then the 1952 General 
Programme for the Implementation of Nationalities Regional Autonomy, and 
the 1954 Constitution. Many of the key principles in these documents still 
inform the current system and will be discussed below. 
 Structuring representation of minorities also involved a scholarly “scientiﬁ c” 
dimension, the project of Ethnic Classiﬁ cation ( minzu shibie ). In a process that 
began in the early 1950s and was largely completed by 1956, 19 teams of scholars 
assessed minority groups for designation as oﬃ  cially-recognized nationalities. 20 
While 400 ethnic designations were put forward based on self-identiﬁ cation, 
only 56 nationalities (including the Han) were eventually recognized. 
 In the early years of the PRC, the CCP cooperated with local elites, including 
those in ethnic areas, reﬂ ecting the broader “united front” policies, but also its 
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 21)   See Dreyer,  supra note 16, pp. 94 and 102–103. 
 22)  A.M. Dwyer,  Th e Xinjiang Conﬂ ict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse , 
East-West Center, 2005, p. 7. 
 23)  In fact, the Tibetan government, as conceived by Beijing, also had a third subdivision: a govern-
ment formed by secular Tibetans based in Chamdo, eastern Tibet.  See Dreyer,  supra note 16, 
p. 134. 
 24)  M.C. Goldstein, D. Sherap and W.R. Siebenschuh,  A Tibetan Revolutionary: Th e Political Life 
and Times of Bapa Phüntso Wangye (2004) pp. 150–151. 
 25)   Ibid. , p. 146. 
 26)   See Smith,  supra note 12, p. 11. 
lack of knowledge about, or roots in, most minority areas. 21 Minority elites were 
recruited into the new structures of power, and fairly liberal policies on matters 
such as minority languages were adopted. 22 
 Th e case of Tibet represented the largest degree of accommodation with the 
existing political leadership in an autonomous area. As a result of negotiations 
between the Tibetans and Beijing, the “17 Point Agreement” was signed in May 
1951. At this point, no detailed outline of the NRA policy had yet been made pub-
lic. Beijing’s principal concession to the Tibetans was the guarantee that the 
“Central Authorities would not alter the existing political system in Tibet” or the 
“established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama”. As a counter- 
balance, however, the agreement also recognized a rival religious ﬁ gure, the 
Panchen Lama. 23 Th e establishment of a Military and Administrative Bureau in 
Tibet representing the central government was a contentious issue in the negotia-
tions, which the Tibetans only accepted on the understanding that the Bureau 
would be headed by the Dalai Lama, and that it would be a temporary arrange-
ment. 24 Th e agreement reportedly had a “secret codicil” which speciﬁ ed that very 
few Chinese troops would be stationed in Tibet. 25 But this agreement was nulli-
ﬁ ed after the 1959 Uprising and was denounced by the Dalai Lama after he ﬂ ed 
into exile. 
 Central Tibet was eventually designated the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
in 1965. Other Tibetan regions, Amdo and eastern Kham, had oﬃ  cially been 
designated nationality autonomous areas – at prefectural and county levels – in 
the 1950s. Th is reﬂ ected the general preference of the CCP to divide up autono-
mous areas into several political entities, thus diﬀ using their political power and 
securing the principle of central control or democratic centralism. 26 A purpose of 
this division, which also holds true today, was ensuring security along China’s 
border regions. 
 Th e upheaval and radical policies of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) saw 
a negation of autonomy policies as well as extensive cultural destruction and 
assimilation, particularly in Tibet. In the 1980s, there were attempts to rectify the 
damage caused by this hard-line, class-struggle approach. In the early 1980s, 
CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Tibet and Xinjiang and apologized 
for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, ushering in a period of relative 
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 27)   See Goldstein, Sherap and Siebenschuh,  supra note 24, pp. 287–288. According to Phüntso 
Wangye, CCP Document No. 31 stated that “under the uniﬁ ed leadership of the central govern-
ment, Tibet could exercise true autonomy, including the right to make its own decisions. For 
example, all central government guidelines, policies, instructions, and regulations could be refused 
or adapted if they did not conform with the practical conditions in Tibet, although for important 
cases, Tibet would have to ask permission from the central government.” Document No. 46 went 
further: “[I]n special nationality areas like Xinjiang and Tibet, the central government would retain 
authority over only three areas: foreign relations, national defense, and veto power. All other rights 
belonged to the minority areas.” (Th e account does not provide dates of these documents). 
 28)  Mackerras,  supra note 14, p. 27. 
 29)  Cai Dingjian,  Th e Essence of the Constitution [Xianfa jingjie] (2004) p. 74. 
 30)   Ibid . 
 liberalism in minority policy. Two CCP documents on Tibet and Xinjiang issued 
under Hu’s leadership reﬂ ected a commitment to realizing autonomy, with one 
even stating that the central government would only retain control over foreign 
aﬀ airs, defence and “veto power”. 27 
 During the 1980s, various “preferential policies” ( youhui zhengce ) were intro-
duced for minorities and autonomous areas. On the individual level, these 
included eﬀ orts to train more minority cadres, lower standards for entry of 
 minority students into higher education, and hiring preferences for minorities in 
certain types of employment in autonomous areas, as well as more relaxed con-
trols on family planning. In the autonomous areas, levels of economic investment 
were raised, and special poverty alleviation measures created. 28 
 Reﬂ ecting these shifts, the 1982 Constitution contained more extensive provi-
sions on NRA. During the drafting process, the idea that China should adopt a 
federal system was raised – as it had been during the drafting of the 1954 
Constitution – but this was not accepted. 29 In a departure from the scheme of the 
1954 Constitution, however, the 1982 version accorded all local governments at 
provincial level the power to enact local legislation, among several changes allow-
ing for a greater degree of self-government. In addition, it was agreed that auton-
omy should be “extensive”. 30 Th e 1982 Constitution also provided for an 
additional type of autonomy not based on ethnicity. Article 31 allows for the 
establishment of “special administrative regions” and was aimed at the “reuniﬁ ca-
tion” of Taiwan with the mainland. To date, however, it has been used exclusively 
to incorporate Hong Kong and Macau into the PRC. 
 Th e promulgation of the 1984 Law on Nationality Regional Autonomy 
(LRNA) implemented the constitutional provisions on autonomy and expanded 
them in some key areas. Th e Law was revised in 2001 after many years of 
discussion. 
 Following unrest in a number of minority areas – particularly Tibet and 
Xinjiang – the 1990s saw a tougher approach, abandoning the liberal line of Hu 
Yaobang to focus on suppressing separatism and fostering economic development 
as a solution to ethnic unrest. Under this approach, the “autonomy” aspect of the 
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 31)   See White Paper on Regional Autonomy,  supra note 18, Section I.3. 
 32)   See Sautman,  supra note 8, p. 88. 
 33)   See Mackerras,  supra note 14, p. 38. 
 34)   See , for example, N. Becquelin, ‘Staged Development in Xinjiang’, 178  Th e China Quarterly 
(June 2004). 
 35)   See White Paper on Regional Autonomy,  supra note 18, Introduction. 
policy has been played down, while “modernization” is seen as the cure for any 
manifestations of ethno-nationalism. As the 2005 White Paper puts it, “[r]egional 
autonomy for ethnic minorities enables them to bring into full play their regional 
advantages and promote exchanges and cooperation between ethnic minority 
areas and other areas, and consequently quickens the pace of modernization both 
in the minority areas and the country as a whole and helps achieve common 
development of all regions and prosperity for all ethnic groups”. 31 
 Some claim, however, that in recent years central leaders have recognized that 
the high level of economic subsidies to Tibet and the imposition of state develop-
ment plans may not only have failed to resolve ethnic tensions but may have 
actually exacerbated them, thus presenting a window of opportunity for the 
emergence of new policy ideas. Sautman has argued that “[r]ecognition by PRC 
leaders that Tibet is a conﬂ ict like Kosovo, Quebec and Northern Ireland is a sure 
sign that they feel added pressure to resolve the Tibet Question”. 32 
 By the late 1990s, the general shift towards marketization of the Chinese econ-
omy and the preferential economic policies granted to certain areas, particularly 
Special Economic Zones, had resulted in enormous disparities in levels of devel-
opment and living standards between the coastal provinces and the interior. It 
had also made the economic beneﬁ ts that had been given to autonomous areas in 
the 1980s eﬀ ectively meaningless. As part of its response, in 1999, the Chinese 
government decided to “upgrade ethnic issues” by improving life in autonomous 
areas, 33 and in 2000 it launched a campaign to “Open Up the West.” Th e strategy 
is essentially to further the integration of the interior provinces, including auton-
omous areas, with the rest of the country, through increasing Han migration, 
massive infrastructure projects, and targeted investment. 34 
 In sum, although the overall purpose of the NRA policy has changed over 
time, certain state objectives have remained dominant, including ensuring secu-
rity along China’s borders, an imperative which has informed the approach of 
integrating autonomous areas and their populations into the PRC. Autonomy 
has been a pragmatic device for achieving these related goals. Economic develop-
ment, as deﬁ ned by the state, has been the principal method adopted in recent 
years. Th ese purposes are encapsulated in a statement from the White Paper:
 Th e implementation of [nationalities regional autonomy] is critical to enhancing the relation-
ship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among diﬀ erent ethnic groups, to upholding 
national uniﬁ cation, and to accelerating the development of places where regional autonomy 
is practiced and promoting their progress. 35 
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 36)  Common Programme of 1949, Article 51. 
 37)   Ibid ., Article 53. 
 38)  1952 General Programme for the Implementation of National Regional Autonomy, Article 2. 
 39)   Ibid ., Articles 10, 11, 12. 
 40)   Ibid ., Article 4. 
 41)   Ibid ., Article 5. 
 42)   Ibid ., Article 9. 
 43)   Ibid ., Article 36. 
 2.2. Legal Framework 
 As mentioned above, the legal framework for NRA was ﬁ rst outlined in the 
Common Programme of 1949, although this provided only the bare bones of the 
policy. It noted that “regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where minor-
ity nationalities are concentrated” where “various kinds of autonomy organiza-
tions” will be established, depending on the relative size of the population and the 
area in question. 36 Th e only speciﬁ cs provided were that “[a]ll minorities shall 
have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their 
traditions, customs, and religious beliefs”. 37 
 Th e 1952 General Programme for the Implementation of NRA gave a rela-
tively detailed outline of the policy. It stated that all autonomous areas are “an 
integral part” of the PRC, that their governments are “local governments” led by 
higher levels and “under the uniﬁ ed leadership of the central people’s govern-
ment”. 38 While the “organs of state power” in autonomous areas would be “auton-
omous organs”, and their governments were to be composed “mainly” of members 
of the minority or minorities exercising autonomy, the principal forms of rule 
were prescribed as democratic centralism and the system of people’s congresses. 39 
Th ree diﬀ erent types of autonomous areas could be established where minorities 
were concentrated: the ﬁ rst was based on a single minority group; the second was 
an area where one group was dominant in numbers but there were a number of 
much smaller groups exercising local autonomy; and the third was an area in 
which two or more groups shared autonomy. 40 Districts, towns or cities popu-
lated by Han people could be included in autonomous areas. 41 
 Proposals for the formation of autonomous areas were to be produced through 
consultation between higher levels of government and minority representatives, 
but all had to be approved at central level. 42 Representative conferences were to 
be convened in the relevant areas, provided “revolutionary order” had been estab-
lished and “regional autonomy [was] the common desire of all sections of the 
people”. Th ese conferences could be based on existing organizations, or prepara-
tory organizations could be set up for this purpose. 43 
 Th e powers of autonomy described in the General Programme include the 
ability to determine “the actual form” of the area’s autonomous organ and to 
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decide on “internal reforms” 44 based on the wishes of the minorities and their 
leaders; to adopt the most commonly used language as “the chief medium of 
intercourse in the exercise of its authority”, and to use this and other minority 
languages in its culture and education; and “to develop the culture, education, 
arts, and health services of the various nationalities inhabiting the region”. 45 To 
give eﬀ ect to these powers, autonomous areas were given the power to enact spe-
cial regulations “within the limits of [their] autonomous jurisdiction”, but these 
must comply “with the provisions of the laws and decrees of the central govern-
ment and the local governments of higher levels”, be approved by the two next 
highest levels of government, and be submitted to the centre for the record. 46 Th e 
General Programme also includes provisions for the exercise of various powers 
under the “uniﬁ ed” state system, such as ﬁ nance, economy, and organizing mili-
tary forces. 47 
 As well as mandating equality among the nationalities, the General Programme 
required that autonomous area governments guarantee to their inhabitants an 
enumerated list of civil and political rights, 48 as well as prohibit discrimination 
and educate people to respect each other’s languages, customs, traditions, and 
religious beliefs. 49 
 Higher level governments were exhorted to respect the autonomy powers of 
autonomous areas and to ensure that their “directives and orders” combine both 
the “general line of the Common Programme” and “the special characteristics and 
actual conditions” of these areas. 50 Th ey were also to assist the autonomous areas 
in training minority cadres, in “political, economic, cultural, and educational 
development”, and in “overcoming all tendencies to domination by the majority 
nationality or to narrow nationalism”. 51 A principal method would be to “acquaint 
the people of the nationality autonomous regions with the advanced experiences 
and conditions in political, economic, and cultural development”. 52 
 By contrast, the provisions of the 1954 Constitution on NRA were more lim-
ited. Although most of the elements of the General Programme were included, 
overall there was a much greater emphasis on the role of the state, as outlined in 
the ﬁ nal sentence of the preambular paragraph on NRA: “In the course of eco-
nomic and cultural development, the state will concern itself with the needs of 
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the diﬀ erent nationalities, and, in the matter of socialist transformation, pay full 
attention to the special characteristics in the development of each.” Th e overarch-
ing principles were that China is a unitary, multinational state in which all nation-
alities are equal, and discrimination or acts that undermine “the unity of the 
nationalities” were prohibited. Nationalities could use their own languages, and 
“preserve or reform their own customs or ways”. Areas inhabited “entirely or 
largely” by minorities would practice regional autonomy, but such areas were also 
“inalienable parts” of the PRC. 53 
 Th ere was no mention of any role for minorities themselves in deﬁ ning auton-
omous areas, and their “organs of self-government” were to be established in the 
same fashion as ordinary localities, a process prescribed in the Constitution, 
although “the wishes of the majority” could determine “the form” of these 
organs. 54 Requirements for minority leadership were vague, with each nationality 
only allowed “appropriate representation” in autonomous government. 55 Higher 
level state organs were no longer required to “respect” autonomy, but to “safe-
guard the rights of organs of self-government” and to assist minorities in their 
development. 56 
 Th e scope of language rights was more constrained. Apart from the provision 
on being able to use their own language(s) without any context being speciﬁ ed, 
the only other stipulation was that organs of self-government in the autonomous 
areas use minority language(s) in “performing their duties”. 57 However, a provi-
sion was added requiring courts to use minority languages and provide 
interpreters. 58 
 Limiting the authority of autonomous areas “by law” was a key element. 
Autonomy needed to be exercised “within the limits of authority prescribed by 
the Constitution and the law”, and autonomous areas were to administer their 
own ﬁ nances as “prescribed by law”. 59 During the drafting of the 1954 
Constitution, there was debate over whether the autonomous powers of the NRA 
areas needed to comply with the Constitution and other laws. Leaders such as 
Deng Xiaoping believed that they should comply. 60 Th e Constitution provided 
for autonomous areas “to enact autonomy regulations and special regulations in 
accord with the special political, economic and cultural characteristics of the local 
nationality”, 61 but did not specify any scope for such regulations. However, the 
 Y. Ghai et al. / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 17 (2010) 137–186 149
 62)  Th is contrast is noted by Zhou Wei,  Research on the Legislative Power of Autonomous Areas to 
Enact Special Regulations [Minzu zizhi difang danxing tiaoli lifaquan yanjiu], Social Science Research, 
1998, no. 1, p. 75. 
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approval process for these regulations was made subject to tighter control: all 
such legislation required National People’s Congress (NPC) approval. At the 
time, no other localities had the power to enact legislation; so this was a signiﬁ -
cant exception to the PRC’s overall unitary scheme. 62 
 3. Current Legal Framework 
 Th e current systems of autonomy were established by the 1982 Constitution – 
within the broad contours of the nature of the Chinese state. China is deﬁ ned as 
a “unitary multinational state” under the command of the Communist Party and 
the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Th ought with the aim of 
furthering socialist policies through democratic centralism and dictatorship. On 
the nationalities’ question, “socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assis-
tance among the nationalities” will be strengthened. Th e Constitution also states 
that autonomy is necessary in order to safeguard the unity of the nationalities and 
to combat big-nation (mainly Han) chauvinism and local national chauvinism. 
“Han chauvinism” refers to Han arrogance towards and contempt for minorities, 
rooted in the Confucian perception of minorities as “barbarians”. “Local chau-
vinism” refers to minorities asserting rights claims that go beyond what the cen-
tral state is willing to countenance. Among the people, particularly the Han, 
there is as strong a feeling of identity based on ethnicity as on territory. Pye 
observes that, for “reasons which spring deep from within the Chinese spirit and 
which have been reinforced during the era of Western encroachment and of the 
‘unequal treaties’, the Han Chinese have developed a powerful sense of their ter-
ritorial identity, which, some might say, overrides their sense of cultural iden-
tity”. 63 Th erefore it is within this strong sense of territory and the Leninist 
obsession with control that autonomy policies and provisions of the 1982 
Constitution should be understood and analyzed. 
 Th e Constitution recognizes two types of autonomy. Th e ﬁ rst is regional 
autonomy for minority nationalities in areas where they “live in concentrated 
communities” (Article 4). In these areas, “organs of self-government are estab-
lished to exercise the power of autonomy.” Th e other system, established 
under Article 31, gives the NPC broad authority to establish special administra-
tive regions with their own “systems” “in the light of speciﬁ c conditions”. Th e 
Constitution provides no further details and hence vests the NPC with much 
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greater ﬂ exibility and discretion than for the ﬁ rst type of autonomy. It also envis-
ages, if necessary, a process of negotiations before the constitutional provisions of 
a special administrative region are established. In this section, we examine the 
ﬁ rst type of autonomy. 
 Article 4 sets out China’s policy on ethnic (“nationalities”) relations. It says that 
all nationalities are equal, prohibits discrimination against any of them and 
emphasizes the unity of all nationalities (“any act which undermines the unity of 
the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited”; “All national autonomous 
areas are integral part of the People’s Republic of China”). It commits the state to 
assist the economic and cultural development of minority nationalities. It also 
gives all nationalities the freedom to use and develop their spoken and written 
languages and to preserve or reform their own “folkways and customs”. 
 Th e powers of the organs of self-government in autonomous areas are two-
fold. Article 115 prescribes that these include “the powers of local organs of state 
as speciﬁ ed in Section V of Chapter Th ree of the Constitution” which outlines 
the powers of non-autonomous units of local government. “At the same time, 
they exercise the right of autonomy within the limits of their authority as pre-
scribed by the Constitution, the law of regional ethnic autonomy and other 
laws, and implement the laws and policies of the state in the light of the existing 
local situation”. Arrangements for local government essentially mirror those for 
the national level, in that local people’s congresses (LPCs) are the principal organs 
of state power at that level (Article 96), with local governments appointed by, and 
responsible to, them (Article 101). In addition, LPCs at provincial level 64 have 
the power to enact local regulations (Article 100). 65 However, there is a clear ten-
sion between accountability of local governments to their respective LPCs and to 
the higher level state administration; Article 110 lists both responsibilities, and 
does not indicate how they are to be balanced. But the concluding sentence 
reﬂ ects the reality of governance in the PRC: “Local people’s governments … are 
state administrative organs under the uniﬁ ed leadership of the State Council and 
are subordinate to it.” LPCs at the county (rural) and district (urban) level are 
directly elected, while the higher level people’s congresses are indirectly elected by 
those below them (Article 97). LPCs are responsible for ensuring that the 
Constitution, laws and administrative regulations are followed in their jurisdic-
tion, and they also supervise local government policies and budgets (Article 99). 
As at national level, LPCs meet infrequently (the Organic Law on Local 
People’s Congresses and People’s Governments requires meetings “at least once a 
year” (Article 11)), and much of their day-to-day work is performed by their 
 Y. Ghai et al. / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 17 (2010) 137–186 151
 66)  Th is wording may suggest that the NPCSC has no further responsibility, but it has a general 
power to annul local regulations “that contravene the Constitution, the law or the administrative 
rules and regulations”, Article 67(8). 
standing committees, which can exercise most of the powers of the full congresses 
(Article 104). 
 Th e section on local government also provides for directly elected citizens com-
mittees to play a substantial role in self-government at the lowest level of admin-
istration (Article 111). Th ese residents’ committees in urban areas and the 
villagers’ committees in rural areas are not envisaged as government oﬃ  ces. More 
information on these bodies is provided in the section of this paper on political 
representation, below. 
 Th e general principle of nationalities autonomy is elaborated in Section VI 
(“Th e Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas”). Article 112 
prescribes the organs of self-government as people’s congresses and people’s gov-
ernments at the regional, prefectural and county levels. If a speciﬁ ed minority 
exercises autonomy, other minorities in the area should have “appropriate” repre-
sentation. Members of minorities exercising autonomy should be appointed as 
chair or vice-chairs of the relevant people’s congress (Article 113), while the head 
of the government of the autonomous unit must be a citizen of the minority 
exercising autonomy (Article 114). Autonomous areas have the authority to adapt 
“the laws and policies of the state in the light of the existing local situation” 
(Article 115). 
 Th e powers of people’s congresses in autonomous areas include the making of 
“autonomy regulations and other separate regulations in the light of the political, 
economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the 
areas concerned” (Article 116). However, these regulations require higher level 
approval. If they are passed by an autonomous region, they have to be submitted 
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) for 
approval. If they are passed by lower level congresses, they are submitted to the 
congress of the province or region (the term “region” is used for provinces which 
have autonomy) for approval; thereafter they are sent to the NPCSC for the 
“record”. 66 Autonomous areas may administer the ﬁ nances allocated to them 
under the state ﬁ nance system (Article 117) and organize economic development 
“under the guidance of state plans” (Article 118). Th ey have greater powers to 
administer educational, scientiﬁ c, cultural, public health and physical culture 
aﬀ airs, “protect and sift through the cultural heritage of the nationalities and 
work for a vigorous development of their cultures” (Article 119). Th ey may orga-
nize local law and order and security, “in accordance with the approval of the 
State Council” (Article 120). Th ey may employ local languages “in common use” 
in the locality for the work of the organs of self-government (Article 121). 
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Finally, the state should help them in economic and cultural development and in 
training a “large number” of cadres and specialized personnel and skilled workers 
of various professions and trades (Article 122) and take due account of local 
interests when “exploiting natural resources and building enterprises in the 
national autonomous areas” (Article 118). 
 Th e Constitution also provides for the representation of minorities at the 
national level; they must be represented at the “appropriate level” in the NPC and 
NPCSC (Articles 59 and 65). 
 As mentioned above, a second type of autonomy under the Chinese constitu-
tion is provided under Article 31. It was established in the 1982 Constitution and 
seeks to overcome some of the limitations of NRA. Th e Article is short and there 
is little else in the Constitution which relates to this type of autonomy. Th e Article 
itself tells us very little about the purposes and nature of the autonomy. It reads:
 Th e state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. Th e systems to be insti-
tutionalised in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National 
People’s Congress in the light of speciﬁ c conditions. 
 Th us the NPC is given maximum ﬂ exibility to formulate the scope and contours 
of autonomy and adapt it to the circumstances of a region. Th e autonomy must 
be established through a law enacted by the NPC, and as a basic law, it would 
enjoy a higher status than ordinary law. 67 Th e reference to “systems” to be insti-
tuted suggests that the region may be granted characteristics and the power to 
make policies diﬀ erent from those of the mainstream system, reminiscent of the 
content of NRA in the early 1950s and the 17-Point Agreement. It has become 
customary to refer to the autonomy under Article 31 as “one country, two sys-
tems”, but these words are not used in the Constitution. It is well known that an 
arrangement under which Taiwan would rejoin China but retain its market econ-
omy, political system and even its army was envisaged. It has so far been used as 
the foundation for the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macau. 
 As under Chinese law, the Constitution is not binding by itself (see below); the 
eﬀ ective regime of minority autonomy is to be found in the LRNA which was 
passed in 1984 and signiﬁ cantly amended in 2001. Th e Law repeats many provi-
sions of the Constitution on the context and parameters of autonomy. Th ese 
include: (a) autonomy exists within the framework of a unitary state; (b) which 
itself, along with autonomous areas, is bound by the supremacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party and governed by the “democratic dictatorship” of the people; 
(c) autonomy powers are to be exercised under “uniﬁ ed state leadership”  (explicated 
by a number of provisions); (d) autonomous areas’ highest responsibility is to 
promote and uphold national unity and to “place the interests of the state as a 
whole above anything else and make positive eﬀ orts to fulﬁ l the tasks assigned by 
 Y. Ghai et al. / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 17 (2010) 137–186 153
the state organs at higher level” (Article 7); (e) where Han people are a minority, 
they are entitled to the rights of a minority (Article 12); (f ) most powers granted 
to autonomous areas are to be exercised in accordance with “legal stipulations” or 
the “law”; and (g) autonomy has to ﬁ t within the hierarchy of authority whereby 
state organs direct, control and supervise the exercise of general and autonomous 
powers at the local levels. 
 Th e 2001 amendments to the LNRA introduced another critical factor: mar-
ket oriented economic development, in accordance with China’s commitment to 
rapid economic development (see Chapter V). Th e Law reserves all the major 
economic powers and the use of economic instruments for the state. It commits 
autonomous areas, as other parts of the country, to the modernization of the 
economy (and implicitly to new relations of production). Th ey now have to fol-
low policies which encourage domestic and foreign investment, promote the 
mobility of labour and skills, adopt high technology, undertake massive pro-
grammes of education and training in technology and management, increase eco-
nomic production and exports, and build infrastructure. Th ese activities have to 
be conducted in accordance with state direction and assistance, and conform to 
state plans. Th e state is expected to use ﬁ nancial, monetary, and technological 
instruments to speed up economic development in autonomous areas including 
the provision of special incentives to encourage the exploitation of natural 
resources and the building of basic infrastructure. Th e state must assist by sending 
skilled labour from the more developed areas (presumably from predominantly 
Han areas), and organizing training for local people through instruction in insti-
tutions outside the autonomous areas and establishing educational institutions in 
the autonomous areas. Th e general thrust of this Chapter of the Law is the greater 
integration of autonomous areas into the economy and administration of the 
country under the direction of central authorities. Autonomous areas are oﬀ ered 
little space for their own policies, and Chapter V provides for mandatory provi-
sions, incompatible with the concept of autonomy. Privileging of economic 
development over other goals shows that there is no deep commitment to the 
culture of nationalities. 
 One important positive change made in the 2001 LNRA revisions was that 
time-limits were set for the centre to respond to requests for policy waivers 
(Article 20). Prior to this, the centre could eﬀ ectively veto such requests by failing 
to respond. 
 In sum, the following propositions about the extent of minority autonomy 
arise from the language and context of the autonomy provisions in the Constitution 
and LNRA:
 •  Th e primary purpose of autonomy is to strengthen national unity by bring-
ing minority nationalities within the state system. Political arrangements in 
autonomous areas are vehicles for the enforcement of national laws and 
policies. 
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 •  Autonomy is decided on and imposed by the central authorities rather than 
negotiated to reﬂ ect the interests of national minorities. 
 •  Th ere is considerable emphasis on local culture and language, but culture 
seems to be understood in a somewhat restrictive way (“folkways and cus-
toms”). As we shall see there is little freedom of religion, which for many 
communities is an essential part, and sometimes the underlying basis, of 
culture. 
 •  Despite provisions in the Constitution, there is no entrenchment of auton-
omy; it is based on ordinary law which can be changed at the will of the 
NPC or even the NPCSC. 
 •  Th ere is no entitlement to autonomy. Article 12 of the Law says that 
“[a]utonomous areas may be established where one or more minority nation-
alities live in concentrated communities, in the light of local conditions such 
as the relationship among the various nationalities and the level of economic 
development, and with due consideration for historical background”. Th ese 
subjective criteria are linked to the concept of nationality, which as men-
tioned above was based on the Stalinist conception. Even if a group has been 
accepted as a nationality, the decision to establish an autonomous area is 
made, in the case of an autonomous region, by the NPC (Constitution 
Article 62(2)), and in the case of autonomous prefectures and counties, by 
the State Council (Constitution Article 89(15)). 
 •  A massive inﬂ ux of people from other communities could upset any expecta-
tion of autonomy, diluting the special status of the dominant minority. Th is 
has become a particular problem with the movement of Han people into 
minority areas. 
 •  Autonomous areas ﬁ t within the hierarchy of institutions of state, and are 
subordinated to institutions at the next higher level. Th eir powers must be 
exercised within the laws, regulations and directions of central authorities, 
with limited possibilities to opt out of them or take initiatives of their own 
(see below). 
 •  Th ere is no area in which the central authorities cannot invade the autonomy 
of a nationality. It should be emphasized that NRA does not specify spheres 
of powers or subject matter, such as culture, in which the central authorities 
 cannot intervene. 
 •  Autonomous areas must ﬁ t within the general framework governing local 
institutions generally. Th ey have no authority to determine the structure or 
democratization of their institutions or modes of representation. Coupled 
with a lack of eﬀ ective protections of the freedoms of religion, expression, 
association and assembly there is a signiﬁ cant deﬁ cit of self-government. 
 •  Th ere is no independent institution to adjudicate conﬂ icts between central 
and autonomous authorities on the scope or violations of autonomy. 
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 •  Although a considerable role is prescribed for members of the dominant and 
not so dominant minorities in the local people’s congresses and govern-
ments, nothing is said about the organization of the institutions of the 
Chinese Communist Party with whom real power lies (see below for the role 
of the CCP). 
 Th ese limits are reinforced by Chinese government pronouncements on the pur-
pose and scope of autonomy set out in its periodic White Papers. Th ese essentially 
reiterate the framework outlined above, and present an optimistic picture of how 
NRA functions in practice, focusing, for example, on minority representation in 
the local people’s congresses. 68 
 3.1. Scholarly Assessment of NRA 
 Many scholars, including some within China, have been critical of the NRA sys-
tem. For example, Yu’s assessment of the legal and institutional framework for 
NRA concludes that “[i]t is fair to say that the autonomy granted by the PRC 
Constitution and Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law to the autonomous areas is 
 limited administrative autonomy ”. 69 Potter writes that the Constitution justiﬁ es 
“state-centric governance and gradual diminution of local ethnic identity” and 
serves “to entrench policy ideals and approaches that have the potential to mar-
ginalize minority nationalities”. 70 
 A number of scholars have concentrated on how the CCP’s development strat-
egies have served to exacerbate ethnic tensions, in particular by increasing eco-
nomic disparities between border regions and more developed areas. Sautman 
argues that the LRNA “does not mandate the creation of minority economic 
opportunities suﬃ  cient to overcome the gap …”. 71 He also cites Zhang Huijun’s 
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claim that “the gap creates an ‘ethnic psychological imbalance’ … that can emerge 
as an unfavorable factor for unity and stability”. 72 Th e eﬀ ort to redress such imbal-
ances through the Western Development Strategy is viewed by many as problem-
atic since its eﬀ ects in minority regions will likely include greater integration of 
ethnic minority areas into the Han political and economic system. 73 
 Zhou asserts that the “institutional design” of NRA means that it cannot 
achieve its stated objectives. In particular, the mere presence of minority oﬃ  cials 
in autonomous areas’ governments is insuﬃ  cient for the realization of minority 
rights. He points out that there are no mechanisms in the PRC’s NRA system that 
allow for the articulation and representation of the interests of minorities. 74 Other 
commentators have pointed to the reluctance of governmental departments at 
provincial or state level to devolve powers relating to economic interests to auton-
omous areas and attribute the absence of any autonomous regulations at the level 
of national autonomous regions to such attitudes. 75 Zhou and Lundberg demon-
strate through a study of the regulation of hunting in the Oroqen Autonomous 
Banner that state oﬃ  cials lacked sensitivity to the concerns and wishes of the peo-
ple to preserve their culture (where “the hunting life style is the primary marker 
of their ethnic identity”). Instead they were preoccupied with historic leaps in 
economic development, and banned hunting to force people to lead a sedentary 
life style and engage in economic pursuits which ﬁ t into mainstream ideas of 
proper economic activities, thus undermining their traditional practices. 76 
 It is clear both from the law and practice that the concept of “autonomy” in 
China is fundamentally diﬀ erent from increasingly accepted understandings of 
autonomy standards. 77 In the latter sense, autonomy is a device to allow ethnic, 
religious, linguistic or cultural communities claiming a distinct identity, whether 
aggregated geographically or not, to exercise direct control over aﬀ airs of special 
interest or concern to them, while allowing the larger entity those powers which 
cover common interests. Th e precise forms and structures of autonomy diﬀ er 
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from country to country (and in particular forms suitable for territorial auton-
omy are necessarily diﬀ erent from group autonomy). But the following features 
are generally relevant: 78 
 •  Autonomy arrangements which are negotiated in a democratic and participa-
tory way are more likely to succeed than those which are imposed. 
 •  Th ere should be a clear division of powers between the central and autonomous 
authorities (even if there are areas of concurrent powers). 
 •  Institutions at the autonomous level must be representative of the auto -
nomous community (to give moral and political strength to autonomous 
 govern ments). 
 •  Th e broader, national system must also be democratic and pluralist. 
 •  Th e autonomous area must have adequate ﬁ nancial resources and administra-
tive capacity. 
 •  Autonomy arrangements must be legally guaranteed and constitutionally 
entrenched, not liable to be changed by the unilateral decision of central 
authorities. 
 •  Th ere must be some mechanism for consultations between autonomous and 
central authorities on matters of common interest and to resolve disputes. 
 •  Th ere must be an independent institution (preferably an independent court) to 
adjudicate disputes between the autonomous and central authorities if a nego-
tiated settlement is not possible and to interpret constitutional provisions. 
 At the moment these conditions do not apply in China. Th e PRC still looks at 
the role of a constitution with Leninist spectacles: as an imposition, recording the 
victory and securing the dominance of the Communist Party, a statement of 
Marxist ideology and “democratic” centralism, imposing no obligations on rulers 
but constraining the ruled. Th ere are no genuinely independent institutions (and 
this includes the judiciary). Statements of human rights do not translate into 
guarantees. Th e Constitution is not directly enforceable. Th ese are not promising 
circumstances for genuine autonomy. However, as we show later, there are some 
signs of moves towards pluralism and democratization that might lend support to 
the recognition of some pre-requisites for autonomy. 
 3.2. Is Article 31 Applicable to Tibet? 
 As mentioned above, one way of addressing the deﬁ cit of autonomy in NRA and 
advancing a more genuine version for Tibet would be a Hong Kong-style solu-
tion. In what ways may Article 31 autonomy be superior to NRA? If applied to 
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Tibet, what problems might it solve that are inherent in NRA? How easily can 
Article 31 autonomy be applied to Tibet given that it has been integrated into the 
economic and legal system of the Mainland? We examine these questions through 
a brief examination of the experience of Hong Kong. However, it should be 
pointed out that a hallmark of Article 31 is its ﬂ exibility; the Hong Kong SAR 
does not need to serve as a prototype (although it seems to have done so for 
Macau), 79 and the scope and mechanisms of autonomy would undoubtedly be 
diﬀ erent if eventually applied to Taiwan as originally envisaged. 
 A major barrier to such a solution is the PRC’s insistence that Article 31 cannot 
apply to Tibet. Th e 2004 White Paper on Tibet states that:
 Th e situation in Tibet is entirely diﬀ erent from that in Hong Kong and Macau. Th e Hong 
Kong and Macau issue was a product of imperialist aggression against China; it was an issue 
of China’s resumption of exercise of its sovereignty … the Central government has always 
exercised eﬀ ective sovereign jurisdiction over the region. 
 Th e PRC position is that Article 31 may only be used for the recovery of regions 
which were taken away from the “motherland” and cannot therefore be applied 
in Tibet. But it is hard to sustain the idea that Article 31 was envisaged as having 
any broader application than as a solution to the Taiwan question. Th e provision 
is clearly linked to the preambular statement: “Taiwan is part of the sacred terri-
tory of the PRC. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including 
our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the 
motherland.” 80 
 Cai describes Article 31 as being speciﬁ cally designed to incorporate into the 
PRC distinct areas of the country “where, for historical reasons, socialism had not 
been practiced” and allow them to continue their existing systems, capitalism in 
particular. 81 A report from the time cites an NPC deputy as stating that the 
autonomy of SARs diﬀ ers from national and ordinary local autonomy. 82 However, 
the provisions in both the 1951 17-Point Agreement between Tibet and the 
Central People’s Government and the General Programme on the accommoda-
tion of diﬀ erent “systems” can be regarded as the precursors of Article 31 and thus 
the question of its application in Tibet may be raised. Also, the very fact that the 
NRA system incorporates autonomous areas at diﬀ erent administrative levels 
with varying powers indicates that autonomy in the PRC has consistently been 
asymmetrical, and that a diﬀ erentiated approach has been taken in which the 
circumstances of each autonomous area is considered on its own. 
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 Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 
of China (HKSAR) on 1 July 1997 when Britain transferred sovereignty over 
Hong Kong to China. Th ere were two distinct phases in the establishment of the 
HKSAR. Th e ﬁ rst was negotiations between China and Britain on the terms of 
the transfer of sovereignty. 83 At ﬁ rst China was reluctant to negotiate the terms 
with Britain; instead it stated “one country two systems” as the basis of Hong 
Kong’s constitutional system. According to this formula, Hong Kong’s economic, 
legal and social systems, including the protection of human rights, would remain 
unchanged, and its political system would retain its essential features (including 
the absence of democracy) but adjusted to the reality of a new “sovereign”. All of 
this was encapsulated in about 12 points on one page. However, Britain wanted 
a treaty to agree on Hong Kong’s new system, and was concerned to elaborate the 
provisions of the new law for Hong Kong in great detail and to secure ﬁ rm legal 
foundations. Th e result was the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question 
of Hong Kong, 1984, which would also serve as the basis of the Basic Law that 
the NPC would enact. 
 Th e second phase was the drafting of the Basic Law by a Basic Law Drafting 
Committee appointed by China. It consisted of 59 members, of which a majority 
(36) were from the Mainland. Th e drafting of the Law, which was intended to 
give eﬀ ect to the Joint Declaration, took about four years. It was enacted in April 
1990 and came into eﬀ ect on 1 July 1997. 
 Th is brief account indicates that Article 31 could serve as a framework for 
negotiations, unlike the LNRA which is detailed, non-negotiable and cannot 
really be accommodated to the speciﬁ c needs of a region. But the PRC position 
sometimes has been that the Central Authorities would not negotiate with its 
own people, and the Article became the framework for negotiations only because 
sovereignty rested with a foreign power. However, the PRC cannot be too dog-
matic about it because in the case of Taiwan, it would have to negotiate with its 
people and leaders. 
 Th e second point is the ﬂ exibility that the Article facilitates. Th e Basic Law 
enabled Hong Kong to opt out of many provisions of the Chinese Constitution, 
in particular the detailed way in which the rule of the Communist Party is 
expressed (including the nomenklatura), and Marxist political and economic ide-
ology. Very few Mainland laws apply in Hong Kong. Th e Hong Kong legislature 
has the authority to make laws and policies on all matters other than defence 
and foreign aﬀ airs, but even in these areas, it has primary responsibility for inter-
nal security and is authorized to enter into agreements with foreign states and 
 international ‘organisations’ (and is a member of many international and 
regional organizations). Hong Kong has its own currency, monetary and ﬁ scal 
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system; can issue its own passports; controls its immigration policies; decides on 
infrastructural development; is responsible for education, health, etc. It has its 
own system of justice, the common law applies, and there is a separate – and 
independent – court system. English is an oﬃ  cial language. Land belongs to the 
state, but its administration is in the hands of the SAR (income from sale or lease 
of lands goes to Hong Kong). Rights and obligations are based more on the con-
cept of a “permanent resident of Hong Kong” than on Chinese citizenship, which 
enables Hong Kong to preserve its identity and restrict entry to and residence in 
Hong Kong of Mainlanders (and others). 
 Th e third point is that it has been possible to secure relatively secure legal foun-
dations for Hong Kong’s autonomy – based on an international treaty with 
Britain (which is no longer of any great practical signiﬁ cance) and national con-
stitutional provisions. Th e NPC can amend the Basic Law, but no amendment 
can “contravene the established basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong” 84 – 
a reference to the provisions of the Joint Declaration. Within Hong Kong, the 
Basic Law – which entrenches fundamental human rights – is supreme and all 
other Hong Kong laws must be compatible with it. An independent judiciary 
reviews challenges to laws, regulations and policies, thereby reinforcing the spe-
cial status of the Basic Law, and preserving the rule of law to a greater extent than 
in any other region of China. 
 Th is is not to say that problems do not exist. Although the Basic Law deﬁ nes 
in detail the relationship between Hong Kong and Mainland institutions, with a 
view to ensuring Hong Kong’s autonomy, it has been hard in practice to fully 
ensure that autonomy. Th e Central Authorities are frequently referred to as the 
“sovereign”; the Chief Executive of Hong Kong is essentially an appointee of the 
Central People’s Government, and being the most important oﬃ  cial in Hong 
Kong, serves to implement directives s/he receives from Beijing. Th e lack of 
democracy in political institutions in Hong Kong and China means that deci-
sions are made bureaucratically, without people’s participation, and the autonomy 
of the people is thereby weakened. Doubts remain as to the exact scope of 
the application of the PRC Constitution (contrary perhaps to the intention that 
the Law under Article 31 would establish a self-standing constitutional order). 
Th e Standing Committee of the NPC has the power to interpret the Basic Law 
and thus bypass the restrictions on its amendment in Article 159. Th is power has 
been used three times and has arguably undermined the legal foundations for 
Hong Kong’s autonomy. 85 Th ere is no independent judicial body which can 
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 adjudicate disputes over the provisions regarding the relationship of Hong Kong 
and the Central Authorities. Th ese matters are in fact decided by the Central 
Authorities themselves. Th e constitutional foundations of Article 31 autonomy 
have turned out to be less eﬀ ective than was once expected. Th e autonomy is 
granted for only 50 years, and since the Basic Law came into force, there has been 
greater economic and social integration between Hong Kong and China than was 
implicit in that Law. On the positive side, apart from diﬀ erences over democracy, 
there has been little to divide Hong Kong and China, and in practical, day-to-day 
matters, Hong Kong enjoys considerable autonomy, and is able to pursue its dis-
tinctive lifestyle. 
 So Article 31 autonomy, suitably framed, would be in Tibet’s interests. Tibet 
may not need the same degree of autonomy, e.g. of monetary or ﬁ scal systems, 
international trade or the legal system, but the freedom of religion, freedom to 
pursue language policies, and develop a distinct political system based on genuine 
local representation and participation, and relations between Tibetans and non-
Tibetans living in Tibet, necessary to the vision Tibetans have for their region, 
could be accommodated under Article 31. 
 Whether Tibet would be entitled to rely on Article 31 is more a political than 
a legal issue. Even in the disputed 17-Point Agreement, Tibet’s special status and 
its distinctive concerns are recognized, which prompted distinct treatment of 
Tibetan compared with other minorities. In addition, it seems evident that the 
idea of tolerating “diﬀ erent systems” within the PRC that is expressed in Article 
31 originated in NRA as conceived in the years immediately after 1949. It is clear 
that the needs and legitimate aspirations of Tibetans are distinctive in several 
respects, and if genuine autonomy is to be exercised in Tibet, the framework of 
the NRA as it has operated in the reform era will be inadequate. At the least, 
considerable adjustments to the NRA legislation would be necessary, and a mid-
way position between NRA and Article 31 may be required. 
 4. Th e Operation of National Regional Autonomy 
 4.1. Political Representation and the Role of the Chinese Communist Party 
 Although the extent to which China is democratizing is hotly debated among 
scholars and observers, it is indisputable that mechanisms to make local gover-
nance more accountable  are providing opportunities for some popular input into 
local politics. Th ese mechanisms could potentially allow for the engagement of a 
wider range of Tibetan interests in local political aﬀ airs, particularly if it were in 
a climate of reduced tensions in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Also, if there 
were more involvement of independent-minded Tibetans in the local people’s 
congresses (LPCs), this could make for a more eﬀ ective and meaningful use of 
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the legislative powers granted to the TAR and to other Tibetan autonomous areas 
(described below). 
 However, the growing Han presence in the cities of the TAR may militate 
against the impact of greater representation. Th e PRC has institutionalized dis-
crimination against rural residents in its people’s congress system, with one urban 
vote having the same weight as four rural votes. Since Tibetans in the TAR mostly 
live in rural areas, they will have fewer deputies representing them than urbanites, 
thus giving the votes of Han settlers greater weight. By the early 1990s, Han 
representatives made up a majority in three of the ﬁ ve autonomous regions in the 
PRC. 86 
 Th e dominance of the CCP in the Chinese political system is another factor 
that eﬀ ectively limits the functioning of the autonomy system, and blocks the 
formation of institutions that are genuinely representative of minority interests. 
Political considerations are paramount in the implementation of regional ethnic 
autonomy. Party policies toward ethnic minorities (and Tibetans in particular) 
need to be considered along with the legal framework. 
 Th is section brieﬂ y reviews developments in electoral politics in the reform-era 
PRC that could provide greater representation, and then proceeds to consider the 
impact of the CCP’s organizational grip on the possibilities for greater exercise of 
autonomy in the TAR. 
 4.1.1. Th e Electoral System 
 Th e spread of competitive elections to villagers’ committees in China’s country-
side has elicited a great deal of speculation about the CCP’s attitude to democra-
tization. While these elections are certainly signiﬁ cant, it is important to point 
out that apart from this and some minor local experimentation, the electoral 
system has remained basically unchanged since the enactment of the 1979 
Election Law. 87 
 Control over nominations has been the major means by which the CCP has 
continued to dominate the electoral process. Although the 1979 Election Law 
provided for secret ballots, expanded the scope of direct elections to PCs at 
county/district level, required more candidates than seats and allowed any three 
voters to nominate a candidate, in practice Party-dominated election commit-
tees 88 have continued to ensure that the candidate list reﬂ ects the CCP’s wishes. 
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 Discrimination against rural people is reﬂ ected in the electoral system, in 
which rural votes count much less than those in urban areas. Th e 1979 Election 
Law, as amended in 1995, 90 provides that a universal proportion of four rural 
votes is equivalent to one urban vote. 91 In the Tibetan areas this requirement 
would mean that votes of the Han population oﬃ  cially resident in the cities have 
greater weight than those of rural Tibetans. 
 Promoting mechanisms to make oﬃ  cials accountable has been one aspect of 
Beijing’s project of ensuring political stability. Th e idea that the attitude of the 
people towards candidates for leadership should matter under the “principle of 
recognition by the masses” has been one aspect of this. 92 Th is takes a variety of 
forms, including primary elections under the name of “opinion polling.” 
 One example of this emerged from Shanxi Province in the 1990s, where pro-
tests against corrupt and abusive village Party leaders led to a system of subjecting 
candidates for oﬃ  ce in village Party branches to a “vote of conﬁ dence” or “vote of 
recommendation” prior to the formal intra-Party elections for these posts. Such 
practices have now spread to a number of provinces, despite lack of endorsement 
by the centre. 93 In some places, the CCP has conducted opinion polls to deter-
mine attitudes towards diﬀ erent candidates for local Party leadership positions. 94 
 4.1.2. Th e Role of People’s Congresses 
 A noted development in Chinese politics over the last two decades has been the 
rise of the people’s congresses (PCs) as an important power base at the national 
and the local level. Th is does not mean they have become independent; they are 
still dominated by the Party, with about 70 per cent of PC deputies nationwide 
being CCP members. 95 However, a handful of independent deputies have been 
elected to local people’s congresses (LPCs) nationwide. 
 As institutions, the PCs are playing a growing role in the political system, both 
as the source of the legislation which codiﬁ es the constitutional provision “ruling 
the country in accordance with law and establishing a socialist rule of law state” 96 
and as a mechanism of “supervision” over government. 
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 LPCs have often been pioneers in establishing mechanisms for holding govern-
ment agencies accountable. One major way in which they do this is through 
supervising the implementation of law. Th is function ﬁ rst appeared in the mid-
1980s when PCs initiated law implementation inspection visits. Whether in the 
NPC or in LPCs, special panels are set up for the purpose, which sometimes 
solicit opinions from the public and publicize inspection activities and their out-
comes through the media. 97 
 4.1.3. Village Elections 
 Th e aspect of political reform in the PRC that has attracted the greatest attention 
overseas is elections to villagers’ committees (VCs). Often dubbed “grassroots 
democracy”, the spread of competitive and relatively open elections in many vil-
lages across the country has been heralded as the ﬁ rst step towards democratiza-
tion in China. 
 VCs (and urban residents’ committees) were written into the 1982 Constitution 
as elected “mass organisations of self-management at the grassroots level.” Th eir 
tasks are: “Th e residents’ and villagers’ committees establish committees for peo-
ple’s mediation, public security, public health and other matters in order to man-
age public aﬀ airs and social services in their areas, mediate civil disputes, help 
maintain public order and convey residents’ opinions and demands and make 
suggestions to the people’s government” (Article 111). 
 Villagers committees are not technically organizations of government, but a 
kind of executive of village self-governance. As Th urston puts it, “[e]lected village 
leaders are not government oﬃ  cials. Rather, they are transmission belts between 
the government and the villagers, reporting popular opinion and proposals to the 
government, helping to maintain social order, and mediating civil disputes.” 98 
VCs are also responsible for implementing state policies in the villages. 
 After more than a decade of experimentation with competitive village elec-
tions, in November 1998 the NPCSC passed the Organic Law of the Villagers’ 
Committees of the PRC. Th e Organic Law includes various provisions related to 
elections, such as banning appointment of members to VCs (Article 11), requir-
ing the publication of an electoral roll 20 days before polling (Article 12), requir-
ing the establishment of an election committee elected by the Villagers’ Assembly 99 
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(Article 13), requiring a greater number of candidates than seats 100 and that can-
didates  be nominated by members of the electorate, and mandating secret ballots 
and open vote counting (Article 14). In some areas, nomination procedures have 
been made more open and meaningful by conducting primaries, in which all vot-
ers can nominate candidates for available oﬃ  ces. Th is often leads to a situation in 
which there are many more candidates than seats, with two or more contesting 
each top position. 101 
 Th e 1998 law also incorporated a new article on CCP basic level organizations 
acting as the “leadership core” in the villages that, “in accordance with the 
Constitution and the laws, support and guarantee that villagers engage in self-
governance activities and directly exercise their democratic rights” (Article 3). 
Th e continuing lack of clarity about the relationship between these two institu-
tions often results in tensions. 102 
 Th e proportion of villages which have held competitive elections for VCs is 
unclear. Even where contested elections have been held, the impact on local con-
ditions and power structures vary enormously, particularly given the dual author-
ity structure of Party and government. Economic factors such as the degree of 
industrialization and the linkage of the village economy to the outside, including 
by migration, are crucial in determining the locus and nature of decision-making 
in any particular village, and the level of interest of villagers in elections. 
 4.1.4. Elections to Urban Residents’ Committees 
 In recent years, there have been some experiments with contested election of 
urban residents’ committee (RC) members. Although RCs are included in Article 
111 of the 1982 Constitution and the Organic Law of the Urban Residents’ 
Committees of the PRC passed in December 1989 (coming into eﬀ ect on 
1 January 1990) is very similar to the Organic Law on VCs, the functioning of 
RCs has generally received much less attention. In 1999, the Ministry of Civil 
Aﬀ airs launched experiments in 20 cities on “fresh approaches to urban grassroots 
self-governance” including contested elections to RCs. Often the procedures used 
have been those developed for VC elections. 
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 According to the law, RCs cover 100–700 urban households, are supposed to 
be composed of elected members, and answer to a residents’ assembly. In practice, 
however, RC members have generally been appointed by local government and 
Party organs. RC members depend on stipends provided by local governments, 
and their only potential resource base is businesses they run or fee-paying services 
they provide. Along with their notorious monitoring function, they are also 
responsible for local security, dispute mediation, birth control and public health, 
environment and sanitation, legal education and social services. 103 
 4.1.5. What Role for the Party in Elected Bodies? 
 As mentioned above, the relationship between the Party and institutions com-
posed of elected representatives, such as VCs, has sometimes been tense, due in 
part to a lack of clarity about the extent to which VCs are subordinate to Party 
branches. Party policy clearly indicates, however, that the leadership role should 
belong to the CCP since it is “the faithful representative of the interests of 
the people of all nationalities, acting as the core that brings together the eﬀ orts of 
the people of all nationalities”. 104 Of course Party dominance is also written into 
the Constitution, and appears as one of the principles in the LNRA. While this 
is in part an indication of the status of the Law as a constitutional law, it also 
emphasizes the importance of the CCP’s role in the practice of NRA. 
 Th e CCP’s actual exercise of power is based primarily on its organizational 
capacity. In this respect, it remains a Leninist institution, in which lower level 
institutions and members are strictly subordinated to higher levels. A key prin-
ciple in the Party’s internal organization and mode of exercising governance is 
democratic centralism. Th is means that while input into policy is actively solic-
ited, once policy is decided by the centre, Party institutions and members have an 
absolute duty to carry it out, and the “minority is subordinated to the major-
ity”. 105 It also means that Party policy remains paramount in all ﬁ elds, regardless 
of what formal non-Party institutions may have decided, or what laws may say. 
As the preamble to the 2002 CCP Constitution concludes: “Leadership by the 
Party means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership… Acting 
on the principle that the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates 
the eﬀ orts of all quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership 
among all other organizations at the corresponding level.” 
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 A principal way in which the Party dominates state institutions is through the 
so-called  nomenklatura system. Under this system, the Party’s organization depart-
ments at various levels control a list of positions in state bodies, with most speciﬁ -
cally reserved for Party members. At the pinnacle of this organizational ediﬁ ce is 
the list of 4,000 posts which the Central Committee and its organization depart-
ments are responsible for ﬁ lling and supervising. In addition, there is a secondary 
list that includes posts in many public institutions (schools, hospitals, associa-
tions, etc.) and enterprises, for which appointments are to be reported to the 
centre. 106 
 Th us the allocation of many key appointments within autonomous areas is 
controlled by the relevant Party committees. However, this does not mean there 
can be no negotiation over the number of posts subject to the nomenklatura or 
the candidates for such posts. Appointments are increasingly a subject of negotia-
tion between the centre and the localities. 107 By the late 1990s, there were a num-
ber of non-CCP members serving in relatively high positions, such as provincial 
vice-governors, due to “a genuine eﬀ ort” by the CCP to promote such people. 108 
 However, accepting non-Party members and accepting people who do not 
share the CCP’s view of certain issues are two diﬀ erent matters. Th e lack of com-
mitment to ensuring representation of minorities in the Party hierarchy at local 
level has been a cause of signiﬁ cant friction between central authorities and 
minority representatives in the PRC. At the annual NPC meeting in 1997, sim-
mering tensions reportedly erupted in meetings between central leaders and 
minority representatives, and one of the latter’s key demands was that minority 
cadres be appointed Party chiefs in autonomous areas. 109 As mentioned above, 
during the drafting of the 1982 Constitution there were proposals that a much 
larger number of posts in autonomous areas be reserved for minority members. 
 Party control is exerted not only through individual members, but also through 
the formation of cells within institutions. Any organization with three or more 
Party members must create a Party cell. Regardless of their own personal beliefs, 
Party members are required to ensure that the Party line is adhered to in the work 
of their institution. 
 4.1.6. Eﬀ ects of CCP Dominance on Exercise of Autonomy 
 In the context of the autonomous areas, any special powers granted to national 
autonomous areas by the legal framework must be understood in a context of 
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 111)  Mackerras,  supra note 14, p. 26. 
 112)  Rabgey and Sharlho,  supra note 10, p. 39. 
 113)  C. Mackerras,  People’s Republic of China: Background Paper on the Situation of the Tibetan 
Population , a  Writenet Report commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Protection Information Section, February 2005, p. 16. Mackerras quotes a 1996 survey 
on the religious beliefs of Tibetans in the TAR, Qinghai and Sichuan. 
 114)  Shakya, cited in Mackerras,  supra note 14, p. 48. 
Party dominance of decision-making, and the fact that Party leaders in the auton-
omous areas, who are mostly Han Chinese, generally outrank their minority 
counterparts. Figures from 1990 indicate that while 40 per cent of the oﬃ  cials in 
the TAR government and 54 per cent of deputies in the TAR People’s Congress 
were Tibetans, they made up only 22 per cent of the Party Committee. 110 It is an 
unwritten rule that above county level, the Party secretary of any autonomous 
area should be Han. Th is is a considerable impediment to the functioning of 
autonomy in practice 111 In fact, some commentators believe that due to such fac-
tors the TAR enjoys the  least amount of autonomy of any Chinese province or 
region. 112 
 In addition, the CCP does not allow its members to practice religion, a require-
ment that restricts the recruitment of Tibetan cadres and Party members. Most 
Tibetans believe strongly in Buddhism and religion is an integral part of Tibet’s 
unique culture. 113 In the 1990s, the CCP apparently took a more active approach 
toward securing the loyalty of Tibetan Party members and ensuring that they did 
not believe in Buddhism, although they were allowed to attend some religious 
events. 114 
 Local legislative powers both generally and in autonomous areas are also lim-
ited by Party inﬂ uence. A 1991 document entitled “Certain Opinions on 
Strengthening the Party Leadership over the Legislative Work” is a key text for 
understanding the CCP’s role in this regard. According to this document, Party 
intervention is possible in four circumstances: 1. the Politburo and CCP Congress 
should review any constitutional amendments and major laws before they are 
submitted to the NPC; 2. CCP approval is needed for the drafting of any laws 
covering political matters; 3. draft laws covering political matters and drafts of 
major economic and administrative laws should be approved by Politburo mem-
bers before they are deliberated by the NPC; and 4. the Party exercises “uniﬁ ed 
leadership” over legislative work. Th is leadership has four dominant organiza-
tional forms: 1. organizational penetration of the NPC leadership and control 
over NPC appointments; 2. controlling meeting agendas; 3. organizational over-
sight over the drafting process; and 4. pre-approval of draft laws by the Politburo. 
Party members make up more than 70 per cent of PC representatives and they are 
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 115)  Zou,  supra note 95, p. 47. 
 116)   Ibid ., p. 48. 
 117)  Brodsgaard and Zheng,  supra note 97, p. 10. 
 118)  Qin Naichang, ‘Discussion of the Diﬃ  culties in Enacting Autonomy Regulations and New 
Th oughts on Promoting Minority Legislation – Examples from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region’ [lun zhiding zizhi tiaoli de kunnan ji tuijin minzu lifa de xin silu – yi guangxi zhuangzu 
zizhiqu wei li], 3  Guangxi Nationalities Institute Journal (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 
no. 3 (1995) p. 6. 
 119)  Zheng Yongnian,  Institutionalizing de facto Federalism in Post-Deng China? ,  East Asian Institute 
Working Paper No. 9, August 1998. 
 120)  Xia argues that this legislative record increases minority awareness of rights, and may lead to 
greater pressure for real compliance. Xia Chunli, ‘From Discoursal Politics to Rule of Law: 
A Constructivist Framework for Understanding Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China’, 14:4 
 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2007). 
required to abide by Party rules and the Party line. “In principle no law should be 
in conﬂ ict with the Party’s interests and/or inconsistent with Party policy.” 115 
 Th is pattern also applies to provincial legislative work. Zou argues that in 
recent years the trend has been for the Party to relax control over government and 
tighten control over legislative bodies as a way of realizing its policies through 
legal procedures. 116 Another view is that in the PRC the traditional Leninist 
party-state system has been transformed into one “in which the Party is allied 
simultaneously with the executive and legislative branches”. 117 
 According to Qin, a dominant role is assigned to the CCP in ﬁ nalizing auton-
omy legislation. Once drafting of any autonomy regulation is completed at 
autonomous region level, he writes, the local Party Committee has to submit it to 
the CCP Central Committee for review, and the Party centre plays the role of 
consulting various parties on the draft. Only when consensus has been reached 
between the Party centre, central government agencies and the autonomous 
region will the autonomy regulation be submitted to the autonomous region 
people’s congress for enactment. 118 
 4.2. Local and Autonomous Legislative Powers 
 Th e exercise of legislative powers was historically one of the major features of 
autonomy in the PRC, since in the 1954 Constitution autonomous areas were 
the only localities that were granted such powers. During the reform era, how-
ever, the PRC has seen an extensive decentralization of power that some argue has 
created a system of “de facto federalism”. 119 Signiﬁ cant devolution of power to 
legislate for local aﬀ airs has been part of this shift. Such general local legislative 
authority may also be exercised by autonomous regions, as well as larger cities 
with autonomous status that have been explicitly granted such powers by the 
State Council. 120 
 By contrast, the nationality autonomous areas’ powers to “modify” state poli-
cies and laws to suit local needs and to pass autonomy regulations and special 
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 121)  Article 64 of the 2000 Legislative Law provides for local legislation to cover three types of situ-
ations: 1) to implement a law or administrative regulation in the particular circumstances of a 
locality; 2) to cover matters of local concern “for which enactment of a local regulation is required”; 
and 3) to cover matters for which no national law or administrative regulations yet exist. 
 122)  According to the Legislative Law all local laws and regulations must be deposited with the 
NPCSC or another relevant depository organ such as the State Council or the provincial people’s 
congress within 30 days. 
regulations are distinct powers unavailable to non-autonomous legislative organs 
and local governments. Th ey constitute one of the main methods for achieving 
autonomy in the PRC system. Th ese powers, if exercised to a signiﬁ cant extent, 
could provide autonomous areas with much greater possibilities to set priorities 
and implement policies that are diﬀ erent from those set by the central 
government. 
 In practice, however, autonomous areas have hardly used their power to mod-
ify laws and policies made at higher levels of government. Th e extent of adapta-
tion and even outright contravention of national laws and policies by ordinary 
provinces and particularly by special economic zones go well beyond those of the 
NRA areas. 
 Th is section will review the scope of general local legislative powers, the scope 
of special legislative powers available to NRA areas, and then show how in fact, 
due to political reasons, the former have proved to be of much greater utility than 
the latter. However, the contrast should also demonstrate that the potential for 
exercising greater autonomy under the existing system certainly exists, given the 
right political circumstances. 
 4.2.1. General Local Legislative Powers 
 Th e decentralization of legislative power in the 1982 Constitution was among its 
major innovations. Article 100 authorizes people’s congresses of provinces and 
municipalities directly under the central government to adopt local regulations, 
provided these do not contravene the Constitution, national laws, or administra-
tive regulations enacted by the State Council. Local regulations may be made “in 
light of the speciﬁ c conditions and actual needs of their respective administrative 
areas” 121 but cannot modify national laws. Once passed, the regulations are to be 
reported to the NPCSC “for the record”. 122 Unlike for autonomy legislation, no 
higher-level approval is necessary. Similar powers have been granted under spe-
ciﬁ c State Council authorization to the ﬁ ve special economic zones (SEZs) and to 
certain larger cities. 
 As provincial-level units, the ﬁ ve autonomous regions are automatically eligi-
ble to exercise this constitutional power of local law-making; Article 115 of the 
Constitution makes clear that autonomous areas enjoy the general powers of local 
governments as speciﬁ ed in Chapter III, Section V, as well as their autonomy 
powers. 
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 123)  July 1992 NPCSC Decision Authorizing the People’s Congress of Shenzhen City and its 
Standing Committee and the People’s Government of Shenzhen City to “formulate, in light of the 
speciﬁ c conditions and actual needs and pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and the 
general principles laid down in laws and administrative regulations and rules, regulations to be 
implemented in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone which shall be submitted to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council and the Standing Committee of 
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Congresses of Shantou City and Zhuhai City and their Standing Committees and the People’s 
Governments of Shantou City and Zhuhai City to Formulate Regulations and Rules Respectively 
for Implementation in the Shantou and Zhuhai Special Economic Zones. 
 124)  Lin,  supra note 89, p. 154. 
 125)  Zou,  supra note 95, p. 49. 
 126)  Chapter V of the 2000 Legislative Law provided much more detail on the depository system 
and the powers of higher level organs to send back or overturn local legislation. However, to date 
this system has apparently had little eﬀ ect. In 2004, a new committee was established within the 
NPC Legislative Aﬀ airs Commission to deal with questions of conﬂ icts between local legislation 
and the Constitution or laws, but review of local legislation is only conducted if there is a com-
plaint.  See Xinhua, ‘New Body to Address Law Conﬂ icts’,  China Daily , 21 June 2004. 
 127)  Zou,  supra note 95, pp. 51–52. 
 128)  News and Information Oﬃ  ce of the NPCSC Secretariat,  Legislative Work of the Local People’s 
Congresses in the Last 20 Years [difang renda 20 nian lai de lifa gongzuo], 3 January 2001, available 
at: <www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper12/1/class001200001/hwz64637.htm>. 
 Th e SEZs arguably have greater legislative power than autonomous regions. 
Th ey have been authorized under speciﬁ c NPCSC decisions 123 to enact local reg-
ulations as long as these comply with the “general principles” of national laws. In 
practice, this has been interpreted to allow SEZs to enact regulations that actually 
contradict national and provincial legislation. One reason is that no legislative (or 
other authoritative) interpretation exists on the meaning of the “general princi-
ples” of national law. 124 
 Inconsistencies between local laws passed by provincial people’s congresses and 
national legislation are common. 125 Th ere is no eﬀ ective scrutiny of the compli-
ance of general local regulations with the Constitution and other laws and the 
process of submitting local legislation to the NPCSC for the record ( bei an ) is not 
subject to much control. 126 Th e NPCSC is not known to have ever exercised its 
power to repeal local legislation. Many local areas do not even report their regula-
tions to the relevant bodies. 127 
 Th e volume of such legislation indicates the scale of the problem of conﬂ ict of 
laws in the PRC system. An article on local legislation states that by 2001 more 
than 7,000 pieces of local legislation had been enacted, with this ﬁ gure not 
including autonomy regulations and special regulations passed by autonomous 
areas. Over half of currently eﬀ ective local legislation concerns regulation of the 
economy. 128 
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Contestation over Autonomy Legislation in the PRC’, 82:1  Paciﬁ c Aﬀ airs (Spring 2009). 
 130)  Cai,  supra note 29, p. 392; Shi Wenzheng and Bu Xiaolin, ‘Legislation in National Autonomous 
Areas’, in J.M. Otto  et al. (eds.),  Law-Making in the People’s Republic of China (2000) p. 134. 
 131)  Ao Junde and Wu Zongjin (eds.),  Th eory and Practice of China Nationalities Legislation [zhong-
guo minzu lifa lilun yu shijian] (1998) pp. 394–395. 
 132)   See ibid. , p. 399; and Shi and Bu,  supra note 130, pp. 135–136. 
 133)  Cai,  supra note 29, p. 392. 
 4.2.2. Special Autonomous Legislative Powers 129 
 Th e special legislative powers of the people’s congresses in national autonomous 
areas are governed by Articles 115 and 116 of the Constitution. Th e former states 
that the “organs of autonomy” of autonomous areas may exercise autonomy pow-
ers “within the limits of their authority as prescribed by the Constitution, the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Nationalities Regional Autonomy and 
other laws” in order to “implement state laws and policies in the light of the exist-
ing local situation”. Th e latter provides:
 Th e people’s congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact regulations on 
the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of the political, economic 
and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned. Th e regu-
lations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations of autonomous regions 
shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval 
before they go into eﬀ ect. Th ose of autonomous prefectures and counties shall be submitted 
to the standing committees of the people’s congresses of provinces or autonomous regions for 
approval before they go into eﬀ ect, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress for the record. 
 An autonomy regulation ( zizhi tiaoli ) may be deﬁ ned as “a regulation passed by 
the people’s congress of a national autonomous area that deals with basic issues 
relating to the autonomy of the autonomous area and to important matters of 
general concern there”. 130 It may also be considered “a comprehensive regulation 
on autonomy” covering relations between nationalities in the area and relations 
between the autonomous area and the higher level state organs. However, it can-
not regulate other social relationships beyond those between nationalities in the 
area, and it can only partially regulate relations between the autonomous area and 
higher level state bodies. 131 
 Special regulations ( danxing tiaoli ), while covering the same potential ground 
as an autonomy regulation, only deal with one speciﬁ c area in any particular 
instrument and thus are more speciﬁ c in character. 132 In other words a special 
regulation can cover particular issues relating to autonomy in an autonomous 
area. 133 
 In addition to passing autonomy and special regulations, under speciﬁ cally 
delegated powers people’s congresses in autonomous areas can enact modiﬁ cation 
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 134)  Ao and Wu,  supra note 131, pp. 401–406. 
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Law. 
 136)  As passed in 1980, the Marriage Law did not require such approval, but when it was revised in 
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 137)  Ao and Wu,  supra note 131, pp. 401–406. 
 138)  Cai,  supra note 29, pp. 392–393. 
 139)  Qin,  supra note 118, p. 6. 
 140)   Ibid ., pp. 391–392. 
rules ( biantong guiding ) and supplementing rules ( buchong guiding ). 134 At least 12 
national laws speciﬁ cally allow for modiﬁ cation by autonomous areas. 135 Any one 
modiﬁ cation rule may apply to only one law or policy document. Both of these 
types of regulations must be approved by higher level state organs. 136 Modiﬁ cation 
rules authorize the ﬂ exible implementation of a higher level law, regulation or 
regulatory document, or a halt to its application in an autonomous area. Th us 
these may be enacted to waive the application of laws, regulations and govern-
ment policy documents of various types. While an autonomy regulation or spe-
cial regulation might eﬀ ectively supplement an existing higher level legislative 
instrument it will do so in a general sense, whereas a supplementing rule will be 
highly speciﬁ c in nature. 137 
 Unlike general local legislation, all autonomy legislation requires either approval 
by the NPCSC (for autonomous regions) or by provincial level PCSCs (for 
autonomous prefectures and counties). Th e diﬀ erence may be explained by the 
principle that wherever modiﬁ cation is allowed ( ke biantong yuanze ), approval is 
necessary. 138 
 Qin argues that since it requires NPCSC approval, autonomy legislation from 
autonomous regions should be have the same status as State Council enactments 
submitted to the NPCSC for approval and passed by the NPCSC, and thus they 
 should bind national institutions in a way that local legislation does not. 
“[Autonomy regulations] have the character of local legislation, but they also 
have the character of national legislation.” 139 
 4.2.3. Scope of NRA Legislative Flexibility 
 Th e “modiﬁ cation power” ( biantong quan ), based on Article 115, is considered by 
some scholars to be the most important power of autonomous areas. 140 However, 
the scope of this power is not very clearly delineated. To date, the most compre-
hensive legal statement of the scope of autonomy regulations and special regula-
tions is in Legislative Law 66.ii:
 Autonomy regulations and special regulations may adapt the provisions of laws and [State 
Council] administrative regulations to the particular needs of the nationality of the area, but 
this adaptation must not contradict the basic principles of the laws and administrative 
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 regulations, and must not contradict the provisions of the Constitution and the [LRNA] or of 
other relevant laws and administrative regulations with particular application to nationality 
autonomous areas. 
 Th e Legislation Law states in Article 78 that “[t]he Constitution is the highest 
legal authority; no law, administrative regulation, local regulation,  autonomous 
regulation ,  special regulation or administrative or local rule may contravene the 
Constitution” (emphasis added). Article 81, however, speciﬁ es that the provisions 
of autonomy regulations or special regulations on ﬂ exibly interpreting a higher 
level law or regulation will prevail in the autonomous region as will local regula-
tions in an SEZ. 
 Th ere is greater scope for ﬂ exibility in implementing national policies, as 
opposed to laws, although approval for this is also required. Article 20 of the 
LRNA provides that
 [i]f a resolution, decision, order or instruction of a state organ at a higher level does not suit 
the conditions in a national autonomous area, the organ of self-government of the area may 
either implement it with certain alterations or cease implementing it after reporting to and 
receiving the approval of the state organ at a higher level; the state organ at a higher level shall 
give the reply in 60 days since the day on which the report is received. 
 In addition, the LRNA provides that “[o]n the principle of not contravening the 
Constitution and the laws, the organs of self-government of national autono-
mous areas shall have the power to adopt special policies and ﬂ exible measures in 
the light of local conditions to speed up the economic and cultural development 
of these areas” (Article 6(ii)). 
 According to Ao and Wu, the following principles on the permissible scope of 
modiﬁ cation have emerged from law and practice:
 1.  Constitutional provisions are not subject to ﬂ exibility. 
 2.  Provisions of the LRNA are not subject to ﬂ exibility. 
 3.  Where laws already make provision for minority issues, no further modiﬁ -
cation is allowed regarding their subject matter. For example, the PRC 
Election Law for the NPC and LPCs which makes  speciﬁ c provisions for 
elections in minority areas is not subject to modiﬁ cation. 
 4.  Where modiﬁ cation is authorized by particular laws, this should not go 
against the “basic principles and spirit” of these laws. 
 5.  “Th ere is no need for modiﬁ cation, and there should not be any, regarding 
all laws and administrative regulations that are already in accord with the 
‘particular political, economic and cultural characteristics of the minority 
in that area’ and where there is already no impediment to their implementa-
tion in that area.” 141 
 141)  Ao and Wu,  supra note 131, pp. 410–411. 
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 4.2.4. Autonomous Legislative Powers Underused 
 In general, the autonomous areas have not made much use of their special legisla-
tive powers to enact autonomy and special regulations or modiﬁ cation rules. 
None of the ﬁ ve autonomous regions has enacted an autonomy regulation or 
special regulation, although all ﬁ ve have drafted autonomy regulations. 142 
According to a minority scholar from Guangxi, this state of aﬀ airs “is not beneﬁ -
cial to the exercise of autonomy powers by the autonomous areas, and aﬀ ects the 
development of the economy and culture of nationality autonomous areas”. 143 
 By contrast, many subprovincial autonomous areas – including some Tibetan 
areas – have enacted autonomy regulations and special regulations. According to 
Ao and Wu, of the nine laws that authorized modiﬁ cation rules at the time of 
their writing in 1998, such rules had only been enacted in relation to three: the 
Marriage Law, the Inheritance Law and the Election Law. To date, autonomous 
regions have only passed modiﬁ cation rules relating to the Marriage Law and 
Adoption Law. Modiﬁ cation rules related to provincial legislation have only been 
enacted in relation to four such regulations. By 1995, a total of 59 modiﬁ cation 
and supplementing rules had been enacted by NRA areas. 144 
 Th e TAR People’s Congress has been particularly inactive in comparison to the 
other provinces and autonomous regions. A report on the work of the TAR 
People’s Congress from 1998 until 2003 mentions only one piece of legislation 
passed under the autonomy powers: a modiﬁ cation rule regarding the Adoption 
Law. A cursory review of information available from the News and Information 
Oﬃ  ce of the NPCSC Secretariat also indicates the TAR’s inactivity compared to 
other provinces and autonomous regions. 145 Th is disparity may be explained by a 
lack of reporting by the TAR’s People’s Congress on its activities or on the rela-
tively small size of the TAR’s population. However, according to an oﬃ  cial site, 
between 1965 and 2002 the TAR People’s Congress enacted 150 local rules and 
regulations, which is substantially lower than the numbers enacted by other pro-
vincial level jurisdictions. 146 
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 Th e case of Guangxi is illustrative in this regard. Although the passage of the 
LRNA “does seem to have increased the legitimacy of minority demands and 
increased the minority localities’ willingness to demand autonomy”, 147 even in 
the case of Guangxi it has not led to the enactment of autonomy regulations. 
According to one knowledgeable source, the other four autonomous regions were 
waiting to see the outcome of the Guangxi eﬀ orts to pass an autonomy regulation 
before trying to get the centre to approve theirs. 
 Qin’s analysis of diﬃ  culties in passing autonomy legislation in Guangxi illus-
trates some of the factors that have blocked the use of autonomous legislative 
powers. He asserts that despite the provisions of the Constitution and LNRA, the 
view of many oﬃ  cials at the centre is that autonomy legislation is really no diﬀ er-
ent from ordinary local regulations, and thus can only govern matters within an 
autonomous area itself, and not the actions of higher level organs. In practice, the 
State Council has been given an eﬀ ective veto on autonomy legislation at the 
autonomous region level. Qin writes that the NPCSC has ceded its approval 
power to “certain functional departments at the centre, in particular the eco-
nomic management ministries” because this is the way that the division of inter-
ests between local areas and the centre are generally dealt with. Th is is a reﬂ ection 
of the lack of clear provisions regulating such matters generally. 148 
 An account of the drafting of the autonomy regulations for the TAR indicates 
the role played by the CCP. Drafting began in 1980 under the leadership of the 
TAR Party Committee, and the draft underwent several rounds of discussion by 
the TAR Party Committee Standing Committee and the TAR People’s Congress 
Standing Committee and won the support of the NPC Minority Aﬀ airs 
Committee and “relevant central organs”. Th ere were a number of exercises solic-
iting opinions on the draft at consultation meetings and the document went 
through 15 drafts altogether. 149 Reportedly none of these were ever even submit-
ted to the State Council for discussion. 
 Th e content of the 15th draft included:
 1.  A preamble emphasizing national unity and asserting that the TAR was an 
indivisible part of China. 
 2.  Provisions that mainly Tibetans should constitute the personnel of autono-
mous organs and exercise their proper role as masters, but with appropriate 
representation of other minorities, and emphasizing the principle that 
minorities and the Han relied upon each other. 
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 153)  Th e 1982 Constitution represented a liberalization in this regard since previous Constitutions 
had required that all regulations passed by autonomous areas be approved by the NPCSC.  C ai, 
 supra note 29, pp. 392–393. 
 154)  Ao and Wu,  supra note 131. 
 155)  Ghai and Woodman,  supra note 129, pp. 41–43. 
 3.  Provisions on self-government including:
  •  An emphasis on the exercise of self-governance, such as setting develop-
ment plans. 
  •  A detailed series of special policies and ﬂ exible arrangements granted by 
the centre to Tibet. 
  •  Reﬂ ection of the contemporary changes in the situation, e.g. the socialist 
market economy. 
  •  A chapter on religion reﬂ ecting the important and particular nature of 
religion in Tibet. 150 
 It is unclear why the draft did not pass, but it was never formally submitted to the 
NPCSC for approval. Ao and Wu state that, “[i]n sum, the 15th draft of the regu-
lations rather completely reﬂ ected the actual situation in Tibet, thus laying quite 
a good foundation for the draft’s eventual transformation into a bill”. 151 
 Th e 2001 revisions to the LRNA have created uncertainty, and some scholars 
speculate that it will still be some time before regional-level autonomy regulations 
are ﬁ nalized. In the Tibetan case, the power to make such regulations could pro-
vide a structure from which to negotiate speciﬁ c points. In other words, Sino-
Tibetan negotiations could eventually focus on the content of such regulations 
and whether they could contain provisions guaranteeing greater autonomy and 
new arrangements for the relationship between the region and the central 
government. 
 As mentioned above, autonomy regulations have been enacted at sub- provincial 
level. 152 Since these autonomous areas only need to gain approval from the pro-
vincial level people’s congress for any regulations enacted to give eﬀ ect to their 
autonomous powers, in practice they have enjoyed greater legislative ﬂ exibility 
than the autonomous regions. 153 Ao and Wu list 127 such autonomy regulations 
passed between 1985 and 1996 as an appendix to their book. 154 
 However, available information on sub-provincial autonomy legislation indi-
cates that it is essentially a method of implementing higher level laws and regula-
tions, and does not actually exercise the modiﬁ cation power. 155 It is a reﬂ ection of 
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the fact that these areas do not have ordinary legislative powers; so the autonomy 
powers are the only ones they may use. 
 Th is summary indicates that given the reality of lack of oversight over general 
local legislation, in practice, as Lin Feng writes, “tighter controls are imposed on 
the legislative authority of the ﬁ ve ethnic minority regions than on provinces and 
municipalities directly under the [Central People’s Government]. In other words, 
the ﬁ ve autonomous regions enjoy less legislative autonomy than ordinary prov-
inces directly under the CPG.” 156 
 4.3. Regulations and Policy on Religion and Language in Autonomous Regions 
 Two areas of particular concern include religion and language, which form key 
elements of Tibetan cultural identity. Th e following section will therefore con-
sider the extent of autonomy granted by relevant regulations and enjoyed in 
practice. 
 4.3.1. Religion and Tibetan Identity 
 Th ere is a strong link between Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan identity, related to 
the role of religion in the traditional political structure of Tibetan society. Religion 
in Tibetan areas is now strongly linked to separatist and self-determination move-
ments by Chinese policymakers. 157 Much of the religious repression in Tibetan 
areas reﬂ ects attempts to suppress separatist inclinations, and ensure security and 
uniﬁ cation on the centre’s terms. Demonstrations by Tibetans in the late 1980s 
have been blamed on the liberalization policies of the early-mid 1980s which 
allowed greater religious freedom, and the demonstrations were followed by a 
crackdown during the 1990s. 158 
 On the other hand, some oﬃ  cials have reportedly argued that policies to con-
trol religious institutions and personnel in Tibet have not achieved their objec-
tives and that repression has actually backﬁ red. Carlson cites an interview with a 
Chinese scholar – with generally hard-line views on Tibetan policy – who believes 
that “Chinese leaders’ failure to come to terms with the central role of religion in 
Tibetan life continued to block the development of successful policymaking in 
the region”. 159 
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 4.3.2. Regulations Related to Religion 
 Th e 1982 Constitution and the LRNA articulate provisions on freedom of reli-
gion for ethnic minorities in China. Article 36 of the Constitution provides for 
freedom of religious belief and prohibits organizations and individuals from com-
pelling citizens to believe or not to believe in a religion and from discriminating 
against religious believers and non-believers. It restricts this right, however, to 
practices that are “normal religious activities” and prohibits the use of religion to 
“engage in activities that disrupt the public order, impair the health of citizens, or 
interfere with the educational system of the state”. Religious bodies and religious 
aﬀ airs may not be subject to any foreign domination. 
 Th e speciﬁ c autonomy provisions in Article 4 and Section VI of the Consti-
tution make no reference to religion, although Article 4 promises the freedom for 
national minorities to “preserve or reform their own ways and customs”. 
 Article 11 of the LRNA provides that “the organs of self-government of national 
autonomous areas shall guarantee the freedom of religious belief to citizens of 
the various nationalities”. It then repeats the provisions of Article 36 of the 
Constitution. 
 New Regulations on Religious Aﬀ airs came into eﬀ ect in March 2005 which 
strengthen, and provide more detail on, but do not signiﬁ cantly alter the key 
principles of existing provisions. 160 One aim of these regulations is to “further 
standardize the registration system for the establishment of a religious body or 
site for religious activities”, a practice which has allowed state control over the 
deﬁ nition of “normal religious activities”. 161 
 Th e 1997 Criminal Law provides that “[w]orkers of State organs that deliber-
ately deprive citizens of their right to religious beliefs or who encroach on minor-
ity nationalities’ customs or habits, if the case is serious, are to be sentenced to 
two years or fewer in prison or put under criminal detention”. 162 Other articles in 
the Criminal Law, however, could limit religious freedoms by imposing penalties 
on “feudal superstition and superstitious sects”. 163 
 Sorensen and Phillips observe that China has not adopted legislation agreeing 
to “[r]espect the rights of minorities to establish and maintain contact with 
 individuals and communities in matters of religion at the national and interna-
tional levels” in line with international minority rights standards. 164 
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 Sorensen and Phillips summarize national, regional and local regulations 
related to religion in the TAR and other Tibetan autonomous areas which are 
basically implementing measures for national laws and policies and contain some 
local content. 165 Key regional provisions include the 1991 Interim Measures 
of the TAR on the Administration of Religious Aﬀ airs; 1991 Interim Provisions 
of Gansu Province on the Administration of Religious Aﬀ airs; 1998 Provisions of 
Yunnan Province on the Administration of Religious Aﬀ airs; and the 1992 
Provisions of Qinghai Province for the Administration of Places of Religious 
Activity. 166 Th ese provide for the following rights and limitations:
 •  Respect for and protection of religious belief and activity. 
 •  Compliance of religious activities with the Constitution and laws. 
 •  Acceptance of Communist Party leadership and support of the socialist sys-
tem by religious believers and places of worship. 
 •  Government approval for rebuilding or opening a place of religious 
activity. 
 •  Management of places of religious activity by “patriotic religious groups 
whose members must support the Party and socialism, be patriotic and law 
abiding, and safeguard the unity of the State and ethnic groups”. 
 •  Prohibition on the use of “religion or places of religious activity … to incite 
trouble, create havoc, carry out criminal activities such as separatism, destroy 
the unity of ethnic groups, or disturb social and public order”. 
 •  Quotas for the numbers of monks and nuns in religious institutions in the 
TAR. 
 •  Requirement that monks and nuns be “patriotic and law abiding”. 
 •  Control by the propaganda and publishing departments of religious content 
in publications. 
 •  Conformity of religious content in publications to state and Party policies. 
 •  Approval required for “editing, publishing, or distributing” religious 
materials. 
 •  Prohibitions on proselytizing. 
 •  Restrictions on foreign donations to and contacts with religious 
 institu tions. 167 
 Regional and local regulations on marriage, technology and education also con-
tain provisions related to religious practices. 
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 Although traditional marriage ceremonies are permitted in the TAR and 
Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Sichuan and Qinghai, religion may not be 
used to “interfere” with marriage in these locations. 168 
 Th e 1991 Guoluo Autonomy Regulations include a prohibition on the use of 
religion to “interfere with the promotion of technology” and on coercing “indi-
viduals into making contributions to religious institutions”. 169 
 Traditionally, education in Tibetan culture has been religious in nature in con-
trast to the secularized state education system now imposed on Tibetan areas. 170 
Regulations in the TAR, and some Tibetan autonomous areas in Sichuan, Qinghai 
and Gansu, prohibit the promotion of religion in schools and the dissemination 
of superstitious thinking. 171 Th e Ganzi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan and 
the Yushu and Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures in Qinghai “prohibit 
school-age children from entering temples and ban religious organizations from 
recruiting them for religious study”. 172 
 4.3.3. Party and Political Inﬂ uence on Religion in Tibet 
 Overall, Party policy reﬂ ects fears of separatism and the submission of religion to 
Party control and its adaptation to socialist society and Party doctrine. 173 Th e 
TAR Communist Party published a document in 1994 articulating this last 
objective: “Tibetan Buddhism must self-reform … [and] adapt … to suit the 
development and stabilization of Tibet … Religious tenets and practices which 
do not comply with a socialist society should be changed.” 174 
 Since the CCP’s Th ird Work Forum on Tibet in 1994, restrictions have been 
placed on religion, the rebuilding of monasteries, and the numbers of monks and 
nuns. 175 Th is Forum also initiated a Patriotic Education Campaign and Demo-
cratic Management Committees were established in monasteries and run by 
 outside oﬃ  cials in order to prevent Tibetan nationalist impulses and undermine 
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the Dalai Lama’s inﬂ uence. 176 A ban on images of the Dalai Lama instituted in 
1996 continues, 177 and there have been campaigns attacking “the character and 
integrity of the Dalai Lama”. 178 Th ese measures stem from fears that religion 
could eﬀ ectively undermine Party control in minority regions and a belief that 
religion and religious ﬁ gures compete with Party authority for people’s loyalty. 179 
 As discussed in the section on Party inﬂ uence generally, Party members are not 
permitted to profess religious beliefs. A 1997 Xinjiang Party Committee 
Propaganda Bureau Document, although relating speciﬁ cally to Xinjiang, empha-
sizes this principle, which is equally applicable to Tibetan Party members:
 Ordinary citizens are permitted two freedoms. Th ough Party members are also citizens, they 
are ﬁ rst of all members of the party of the proletariat, and therefore enjoy only one freedom – 
the freedom not to believe – and absolutely do not enjoy the freedom to believe. Th ey cannot 
have feet in two boats. 180 
 Th e CCP United Front Department’s Nationalities and Religion Bureau evi-
dently gives high priority to Tibetan Buddhism in its work, with four out of six 
departments devoted to Tibetan issues and only one department assigned to the 
remaining 54 minority groups. 181 
 According to the State Council’s 1997 White Paper on Freedom of Religious 
Belief in China, the Central Government has contributed large sums for the res-
toration and building of monasteries and other religious institutions. 
 Ragbey and Sharlho argue that a complicating factor in relations between 
Tibetan areas and Chinese authorities has been the growing interest of Han 
Chinese – both inside and outside of China – in Tibetan Buddhist practices. 
Th ey contend that Chinese oﬃ  cials exert particular control over monasteries that 
attract Chinese worshippers and cite as an example a crackdown in 2001 on the 
Serthar Buddhist Institute in eastern Tibet. 182 
 4.3.4. Language and Cultural Survival 
 While the Constitution and the LNRA provide for autonomous areas to use local 
languages and allow for education in minority languages in schools, in practice 
the legal equality of minority languages with Chinese is a ﬁ ction. But even more 
important may be the association of Chinese and Han culture with “advanced”, 
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modern life and that of minority languages and cultures with “backward”, tradi-
tional ways. 183 
 In the Tibetan context, the Chinese language has become necessary for con-
ducting daily life in the TAR. Despite legal encouragement of bilingualism and 
use of the Tibetan language, some scholars have observed that Tibetan is actually 
discouraged “because of its association with the Tibetan nationalist movement”, 184 
and that the purpose of oﬃ  cial policy is to ensure the appearance of autonomy 
and therefore greater stability in an unstable region. 185 In the Huangnan Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province, even in institutions devoted to the 
promotion of Tibetan culture the working language is Chinese, and meetings 
with a majority of Tibetans were conducted in Chinese. 186 
 Th e TAR People’s Congress adopted regulations on the protection of the 
Tibetan language on 22 May 2002. 187 Th ey provide that “Tibetan is the common 
language of the Autonomous Region of Tibet”, “Tibetan and Chinese have equal 
administrative status”, “the Chinese and those belonging to other minorities liv-
ing in the Autonomous Region of Tibet must learn Tibetan” and “those bilingual 
in Chinese and Tibetan will receive priority in recruitment to administrative posi-
tions”. Th ese regulations amend earlier provisions from 1987 which required 
Tibetan children to learn Tibetan. Th e new regulations allow children and fami-
lies to choose between using Tibetan or Chinese when attending classes and tak-
ing examinations. 188 Th e regulations limit Tibetan autonomy with regard to 
language by emphasizing the “equality” of the Tibetan and Chinese languages. 
 In practice, however, even in “minority” junior and senior middle schools, the 
medium of instruction is Chinese. Any student who is ambitious must focus on 
learning Chinese, rather than concentrating on Tibetan. 189 
 Reports that relations between Han and Tibetan cadres have worsened – 
 seemingly conﬁ rmed by ethnically motivated violence in the March 2008 pro-
tests – may be due, in part, to language diﬃ  culties since Han cadres often make 
decisions and then use Tibetan cadres as translators – a practice that creates 
resentment and isolates Han oﬃ  cials from the local population. 190
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 5. Conclusions and Possibilities 
 It is not the purpose of this article to suggest or comment on negotiating strate-
gies, but to describe and analyse legal regimes of autonomy. Signiﬁ cant  limitations 
exist in the functioning of the Chinese system of nationalities regional autonomy 
which could hamper the Tibetans’ eﬀ orts to achieve their key demand for “genu-
ine autonomy” and the uniﬁ cation of Tibetan areas within the current system. 
Th ese obstacles include: state priorities of unity, stability, sovereignty, as expressed 
in the strict suppression of any dissent labelled as “separatist”; Communist Party 
supremacy; state economic and development priorities, especially in Western 
regions; weak rule of law, constitutional ideology, and lack of democratic devel-
opment; the possibly temporary nature and integrationist approach to minority 
policy (as informed by Chinese culture and Marxist-Leninist theory); and the 
political realities within Tibet itself of central control and unrealized autonomy. 
 In addition, the 2004 White Paper leaves little scope for negotiation:
 Any act aimed at undermining and changing the regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet is in viola-
tion of the Constitution and law, and it is unacceptable to the entire Chinese people, includ-
ing the broad masses of the Tibetan people. 
 In light of these limitations, possibilities for achieving Tibetan demands within 
the current system may seem slim. However, some possibilities may exist and 
particular points of view within Chinese political and academic circles could be 
encouraged in order to eventually achieve a better environment for Sino-Tibetan 
negotiations. Some trends that may present options include:
 1.  Complexity and larger debate : Rabgey and Sharlho argue that the process of 
policy-making on Tibetan issues has become increasingly complex, possibly 
allowing for more diverse views and greater decentralization of the decision-
making process. 191 Th ey also point out that the ramiﬁ cations of numerous 
personnel changes within Tibetan policy-making institutions are unclear 
but may have some positive eﬀ ects. 192 
 2.  Ethnic nature and problems with economic development  : A greater recogni-
tion of the “ethnic” nature of the Tibetan question and the limits of eco-
nomic development in resolving ethnic tensions may have created space for 
new approaches to the Tibetan question. Several scholars both inside and 
outside China 193 have argued that the policy of increasing economic 
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 development in Western China has failed to resolve the Tibet question and 
may have exacerbated ethnic tensions due to a growing economic gap. Th e 
costs involved in subsidizing growth in Tibet, spending on massive infra-
structure projects and launching the Great Western Development Campaign 
have been substantial for the central government. 194 As a result, there may be 
a greater willingness to look beyond economic development for solutions. 
 3.  Change of leadership at the top : Although Hu Jintao previously took a tough 
approach against separatism in Tibet as the TAR Party Secretary in the early 
1990s, this could actually make him less vulnerable to attack from hardlin-
ers if he chooses to negotiate with the Tibetans. 195 Others, however, have 
observed that his criticisms of Chinese intellectuals in 2004 have cast doubts 
on hopes that Hu would implement a more liberal political agenda. 196 It is 
still unclear how the change of leadership might aﬀ ect minority policy and 
Tibetan policy in particular. 
 4.  Tibet’s uniqueness: Th e Chinese government has acknowledged that Tibet 
has diﬀ erent characteristics from other nationality areas. For example, refer-
ence has been made to Tibet’s “four uniques”: region, culture, signiﬁ cance 
and treatment. 197  Th is could provide justiﬁ cation for special treatment of 
Tibet within autonomy arrangements. Although the Chinese government 
stresses the “system” of NRA, in fact a diﬀ erentiated approach to diﬀ erent 
minority groups has been a feature of this system from its inception. One 
particular issue here could be to allow Tibetan Party members to practice 
their religion, if they so desire, and to allow religious believers to join the 
Party. 
 5.  Issue of trust  : Recent statements by the Dalai Lama that Tibet would beneﬁ t 
from remaining part of China and his willingness to negotiate within 
China’s constitutional framework could address the previous lack of trust 
between the two sides. 198 China’s conﬁ dence may also increase with greater 
political stability in Tibet – and in China generally – and allow for a fairer 
assessment of the risks and beneﬁ ts of greater autonomy for Tibet without 
being coloured by an obsessive fear of separatism. 199 
 6.  Strengthening legal provisions: 
  •  Negotiating the terms of autonomy regulations for the TAR as a “Basic 
Law” for Tibetan areas. 
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  •  Strengthening existing “opt-out” clauses – such as the power to amend 
national laws and policies granted by Article 115 of the Constitution. 
  •  Clariﬁ cation of certain measures which are currently ambiguous – such as 
specifying which national laws do or do not apply to Tibet and the extent 
of local legislative power and central or Party supervision over Tibetan 
autonomy. 
  •  Although the application of Article 31 to the Tibetan case is unlikely, its 
broad wording could allow some scope for achieving a level of autonomy 
somewhere between that exercised by Hong Kong and the national 
regional autonomy system without stressing “one country, two systems”. 
